Curtis Tyrone Bullock v. the State of Texas
05-21-00626-CR
| Tex. App. | Jul 20, 2023Background
- Curtis Bullock and his wife Yvonne Perkins lived in Cedar Hill with three children; on Aug. 8, 2019 Bullock called 9‑1‑1 and officers later found Perkins dead and Bullock wounded.
- Officers observed a bloody knife and later found a bloody hammer in the bedroom; paramedics confirmed Perkins’s death and Bullock had apparent self‑inflicted wounds.
- Autopsy showed both blunt‑force and sharp‑force injuries; the medical examiner concluded the combination of blunt and sharp injuries caused death.
- A grand jury returned an indictment alleging Bullock intentionally killed Perkins “by stabbing [her] with a deadly weapon, a knife.”
- A jury convicted Bullock of murder; at punishment Bullock sought reduction to second‑degree based on sudden passion, which the trial court rejected and sentenced him to 50 years.
- On appeal Bullock raised five issues: variance between indictment and proof (actus reus), legal and factual insufficiency of the sudden‑passion finding, alleged error in the reasonable‑doubt instruction, and lack of trial court jurisdiction due to missing transfer order.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Bullock's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Variance/actus reus (means of killing) | The indictment charged the murder of Perkins; means (stabbing vs. bludgeoning) is a non‑statutory detail and any variance is immaterial. | Proof showed combined blunt and sharp trauma, not solely stabbing alleged in indictment—this variance is fatal. | Affirmed: variance immaterial because the unit of prosecution is the victim; method of killing does not allege a different offense. |
| Sudden passion (legal & factual sufficiency) | There was evidence (conflicting testimony, time gaps, forensic wound patterns) to reject sudden passion; credibility determinations for punishment are for the trial court. | Bullock argued his testimony established sudden passion arising from provocation and no contrary evidence. | Affirmed: evidence legally and factually sufficient to support trial court’s negative finding on sudden passion. |
| Jury charge—definition of “reasonable doubt” (paragraph 3 of Geesa) | Paragraph 3 does not impermissibly define reasonable doubt; courts have upheld its use post‑Paulson. | Inclusion of paragraph 3 fixed limits on reasonable doubt and thus violated Paulson. | Affirmed: inclusion of Geesa paragraph 3 was not error under controlling Court of Criminal Appeals precedent. |
| Jurisdiction—no transfer order from empaneling court | The absence of a transfer order is a procedural defect; Bullock waived any complaint by not filing a plea to the jurisdiction. Also, indictment was first filed in the 265th, which had jurisdiction. | Trial court lacked jurisdiction because grand jury empaneled by the 204th did not enter a transfer order. | Affirmed: issue waived for failure to raise in trial court; record shows 265th court had jurisdiction anyway. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (legal sufficiency standard for criminal convictions)
- Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App.) (hypothetically correct jury charge standard)
- Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App.) (variance concept and prejudice test)
- Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. Crim. App.) (distinguishing variances that change unit of prosecution from means‑of‑commission variances)
- McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. Crim. App.) (elements of sudden passion/adequate cause)
- Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App.) (advising against defining "reasonable doubt")
- Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. Crim. App.) (permitting Geesa paragraph 3 in charge)
- Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App.) (original multi‑paragraph reasonable‑doubt instruction)
- Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas) (failure to raise jurisdictional/transfer issue in trial court results in waiver)
- Gaona v. State, 498 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.—Dallas) (standard for reviewing negative sudden‑passion findings)