414 F. App'x 509
3rd Cir.2011Background
- Curtis Smith was convicted by a jury of attempted murder, aggravated assault, simple assault, burglary and conspiracy, and acquitted on three other charges, receiving a sentence of 13.5 to 27 years’ imprisonment.
- Smith pursued post-conviction relief under Pennsylvania’s PCRA, which was denied, and the Superior Court affirmed, finding no ineffective assistance for failing to object to ex parte jury communications.
- Smith then filed a habeas corpus petition under AEDPA in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; the district court dismissed his claims but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Strickland or Cronic governs.
- The Third Circuit reviews de novo the district court’s application of federal law to the state court decision, under AEDPA’s “unreasonable application” standard.
- The core issue on appeal is whether the mid-deliberation ex parte communications with the jury amounted to a Cronic-presumption of prejudice or whether Strickland’s performance-and-prejudice analysis applies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mid-deliberation jury communications trigger Cronic’s prejudice presumption | Smith urged Cronic applies due to denial of counsel during critical stage | State argued no Cronic presumption; ordinary Strickland review applies | Cronic presumption rejected; Strickland governs |
| Whether the state court’s application of Strickland was objectively reasonable under AEDPA | Smith contends error in applying Strickland rather than Cronic | State contends decision was reasonable under AEDPA | State court’s application deemed objectively reasonable; petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (presumption of prejudice for total denial of counsel at a critical stage)
- Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (defines 'critical stage' and consequences for the accused)
- Ditch v. Grace, 479 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2007) (narrowly construes Cronic's prejudice presumption)
- Toliver, 330 F.3d 607 (3d Cir. 2003) (distinguishes mid-deliberation consultation from other critical stages)
- Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2009) (stage of formulation of jury instructions during deliberations)
- Ellis v. United States, 313 F.3d 636 (1st Cir. 2002) (short-term, localized denial of counsel not a wholesale denial)
- Morrison, 946 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991) (precludes automatic prejudice without showing specific trial counsel actions)