Curtis Russell Oldman v. State, 359 P.3d 964

On Nov. 10, 2013, A.S. (16) robbed a Walmart customer in the parking lot and fled to a waiting Monte Carlo driven by others; A.S. had two guns when he got into the car earlier that day.
Curtis Oldman (27) rode with A.S., his girlfriend Tiesha Underwood (driver), and S.U.; surveillance video and witness testimony placed Oldman outside the car and watching A.S. prior to the robbery and returning to the vehicle as A.S. ran back with the victim’s purse.
After a high-speed pursuit, police stopped the Monte Carlo; two males (Oldman and A.S.) ran and were captured; the victim’s purse, guns, and a bandana were recovered in a nearby field.
The State prosecuted Oldman for conspiracy to commit robbery under Wyo. Stat. § 6-1-303(a) (agreement + overt act); the trial was largely circumstantial (surveillance video, witness statements, admissions by A.S.).
Oldman testified he did not leave the car or know about the robbery until later; Underwood’s testimony conflicted with video on whether Oldman exited the car.
The jury convicted Oldman; he appealed arguing insufficient evidence of agreement and prosecutorial misconduct (prosecutor’s repeated phrase "if he was there, he was aware" allegedly equated presence with agreement).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence of conspiracy (agreement element)	State: Circumstantial evidence (video, conduct, statements, flight, possession of stolen property) permits inference Oldman agreed with A.S.	Oldman: No direct evidence of agreement; mere presence and association are insufficient	Court: Affirmed — circumstantial evidence and inferences from conduct were sufficient to support conspiracy conviction
Prosecutorial misconduct — opening statement phrase "if he was there, he was aware"	Oldman: Phrase misstated law, implied mere presence proves agreement; jury could be misled	State: Phrase was part of broader factual opening; court instructions cured any error	Court: No plain error — court sustained mid-trial objection and instructed jury to disregard; admonition was sufficient
Prosecutorial misconduct — closing argument use of phrase	Oldman: Repetition in closings reinforced improper legal standard; defense counsel did not object	Oldman: Judge had already instructed jury on law; prosecutor explicitly conceded mere presence alone insufficient in rebuttal	Court: No plain error — jury instructions and trial context cured any potential prejudice
Standard of review for unpreserved misconduct claims	Oldman: Trial counsel’s failure to object requires plain error review	State: Applies plain error standard; error must be clear and prejudicial	Court: Applied plain error framework and found no reversible error

Remmick v. State, 275 P.3d 467 (Wyo. 2012) (explains conspiracy requires voluntary agreement and permits inference of agreement from conduct)
Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1995) (agreement for conspiracy may be a tacit understanding; direct evidence is rarely available)
Rathbun v. State, 802 P.2d 881 (Wyo. 1990) (articulates sufficiency-of-evidence standard and two-step inquiry reviewing evidence in light most favorable to the State)
Ortiz v. State, 326 P.3d 883 (Wyo. 2014) (addresses waiver of prosecutorial-misconduct objections and plain error standard)
United States v. Jimenez-Perez, 869 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that disbelief of a defendant’s account may reinforce an inference of guilt)