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494 F. App'x 691
8th Cir.
2012
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Background

  • Nessan filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on November 8, 2010, listing a 2002 Chevrolet Silverado and a Triton boat with motor and trailer, both subject to BankWest security interests.
  • BankWest’s security interests exceeded the value of Nessan’s collateral, and Nessan claimed one-dollar exemptions for the truck and boat.
  • BankWest purchased Nessan’s disability insurance policy from AIG; AIG began making payments to BankWest but later stopped, allegedly breaching Nessan’s policy rights.
  • Nessan valued a potential legal claim against AIG (for policy performance and bad faith) at one dollar and claimed a one-dollar exemption for it.
  • The Trustee sought to classify any AIG-payment-derived equity as estate property and ordered Nessan to deliver the truck, boat, and AIG claim; the court allowed recovery of funds above one dollar to the estate.
  • Nessan refused to surrender the property, appealing, arguing SD exemptions permit full exemption of each item; the district and bankruptcy courts affirmed the turnover order.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether SD § 43-45-4 allows full exemption of property by aggregating exemptions. Nessan contends exemptions exempt the truck, boat, and AIG claim in their entirety if each is individually exempted. BankWest argues § 43-45-4 caps aggregate exemptions for non-absolutely-exempt property; only the aggregate limit is exempt. Exemption is limited by the aggregate cap; not all property is exempt in full.
Whether the Trustee may turn over property beyond the exempted amount based on the aggregate exemption limit. Nessan asserts only the property's exempt portion should be protected from turnover. Trustee may recover estate interest beyond the exemption limit; the allowance of turnover is proper. Trustee may require turnover to the extent not exempt under § 43-45-4.

Key Cases Cited

  • Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. _ (2010) (exemption framework in Chapter 7 largely governs asset treatment)
  • Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (exemptions determine what is excluded from the estate)
  • In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2007) (state exemption interplay with federal code)
  • In re Ludwig, Bankr. D. S. D. No. 01-40473 (Bankr. D.S.D. 2001) (trustee rights to excess equity after exemption cap)
  • In re Hughes, 244 B.R. 805 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1999) (exemption limited by cap; vehicle exemptions and turnover)
  • In re Williams, No. 95-30031 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1996) (debtor may exempt only the excess amount beyond cap by paying difference)
  • In re Foust, 52 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 1995) (interpretation of aggregate exemption under state law)
  • In re Zahn, 526 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review for bankruptcy decisions)
  • Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (state opt-out of federal exemptions and reliance on state law)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Curtis Nessan v. John Lovald
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Dec 5, 2012
Citations: 494 F. App'x 691; 12-1733
Docket Number: 12-1733
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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    Curtis Nessan v. John Lovald, 494 F. App'x 691