Curtis Morrison v. Mark Peterson
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21669
9th Cir.2015Background
- Curtis Lee Morrison was convicted of first-degree murder in 1973 based on multiple eyewitness accounts and physical evidence; his guilt was repeatedly upheld on state and federal habeas review.
- California Penal Code § 1405 (pre-2015 version) provides a postconviction procedure to obtain DNA testing if the movant shows, inter alia, reasonable probability the results would have produced a more favorable verdict and an adequate chain of custody.
- Morrison filed two unsuccessful § 1405 motions in state court (one with counsel in 2006 and a pro se motion in 2010); both were denied by trial and appellate courts.
- Morrison sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting: (1) facial challenges to § 1405’s reasonable-probability and chain-of-custody requirements, and (2) an as-applied challenge when a judge other than the trial judge decides a § 1405 motion.
- The district court dismissed the § 1983 action on the merits; Morrison appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial challenge — “reasonable probability” standard required by §1405(f)(5) | The standard effectively bars testing when other inculpatory evidence exists and is therefore unconstitutional in all applications | §1405’s reasonable-probability test fits within Osborne’s limits and permits liberal application to allow testing in close cases | Rejected — plaintiff failed Salerno test; §1405’s standard is constitutional and compatible with Osborne and California caselaw (e.g., Richardson) |
| Facial challenge — chain-of-custody requirement §1405(f)(2) | Unfair burden on prisoner to prove chain of custody when relevant records are controlled by prosecutors; creates a Catch-22 | California law and practice, and retention obligations, mitigate the problem; courts assess tampering under a flexible standard and §1405 was not interpreted to mandate dismissal based on chain issues | Rejected — chain-of-custody requirement does not violate fundamental fairness under Osborne/Medina |
| As-applied challenge — assignment to a judge other than the trial judge (§1405(e)) | A judge who did not preside at trial cannot reliably weigh trial evidence against potential exculpatory DNA, so the statute is unconstitutional as applied | Appeals and habeas practice necessarily involve judges other than trial judges; §1405 itself provides for reassignment when trial judge unavailable and Richardson already contemplates appellate assessment | Rejected — no due-process violation; rehearing by a different judge is not fundamentally unfair |
| Jurisdiction — Rooker–Feldman bar to federal review of as-applied challenge | State-court losses preclude federal review because Morrison seeks relief related to state-court rulings | Morrison’s §1983 claim alleges an independent federal constitutional injury, not a de facto appeal of the state judgment; Rooker–Feldman is confined to direct appeals of state judgments | Rooker–Feldman does not bar Morrison’s federal constitutional challenge; claim is independent and reviewable |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial-challenge standard: challenger must show no set of circumstances where statute is valid)
- District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (limits on federal due process claims for postconviction DNA access; state procedures must not be fundamentally inadequate)
- Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) (distinguishing independent federal claims from state-court appeals and limits on §1983 challenges)
- Richardson v. Superior Court, 183 P.3d 1199 (Cal. 2008) (California interpretation of §1405’s reasonable-probability standard and guidance to trial courts)
- Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (federal review of state postconviction procedures limited to those transgressing fundamental fairness)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (Rooker–Feldman scope limited to cases where federal plaintiffs seek review of state-court judgments)