Curtis J. Pidgeon v. Judy P. Smith
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7855
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Curtis Pidgeon pleaded no contest in Dodge County to one count of second-degree sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 10 years, under a plea deal that dismissed and read in other counts. The deal also included the State’s agreement not to prosecute a related Columbia County matter.
- Pidgeon accepted the plea because his lawyer, Joseph Fischer, and the prosecutor told him he faced mandatory life without parole under Wisconsin’s persistent repeater statute if convicted in Dodge and the Columbia matter—a calculation that presumed an earlier 1991 Dane County aggravated battery conviction counted as a “serious felony.”
- That advice was incorrect: the 1991 Dane County conviction did not qualify as a serious felony under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(2m), and third-degree sexual assault (the threatened Columbia charge) also likely would not have qualified.
- After learning of the error, Pidgeon sought post-conviction relief in state court (a Machner hearing). The state courts denied relief; the Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed deficient performance but found no prejudice. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review.
- Pidgeon filed a federal habeas petition; the district court concluded the state court unreasonably applied Strickland and Hill, held an evidentiary hearing (where Pidgeon testified but counsel did not), and granted a writ allowing withdrawal of the plea for ineffective assistance of counsel.
- The State appealed only the grant of the writ, arguing Pidgeon failed to prove ineffective assistance because he didn’t call his trial counsel at the federal hearing and (it argued) the district court had required that testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pidgeon) | Defendant's Argument (Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fischer’s advice was constitutionally deficient | Fischer failed to verify whether the 1991 conviction qualified as a serious felony and thus gave objectively unreasonable advice about exposure to life imprisonment | Counsel’s testimony was necessary and his absence undermines the claim; state Machner practice requires calling trial counsel | Court: deficient performance proved — counsel unreasonably failed to investigate statute/case law before predicting life exposure |
| Whether Pidgeon suffered Strickland prejudice from the bad advice | Pidgeon credibly testified he accepted the plea to avoid what he thought was a life sentence and would have gone to trial otherwise; loss of the right to trial is prejudice | The plea was favorable, so Pidgeon’s testimony is self-serving; without counsel’s testimony prejudice is unproven | Court: prejudice proved — credible, unrebutted testimony that he would have gone to trial; loss of right to trial suffices |
| Whether federal court was required to follow Wisconsin procedure requiring trial counsel to testify at ineffective-assistance hearings | Federal habeas courts need not adopt state procedural rules; state Machner requirement is not binding in federal proceedings | District court’s earlier order purportedly required Pidgeon to present the same evidence as in a Machner hearing, implying counsel must be called | Court: federal courts need not follow state procedure; district court did not abuse discretion in allowing Pidgeon not to call counsel |
| Whether district court abused its discretion in interpreting its own pre-hearing order | Pidgeon complied with evidentiary hearing; trial counsel’s absence did not prejudice fact-finding and respondent could have called him | Respondent contends district court misapplied its order and that counsel’s testimony was essential | Court: no abuse of discretion — excusing counsel’s testimony was permissible and harmless given the record |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (applies Strickland to guilty-plea challenges)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (duty to give correct advice about clear deportation or other critical consequences)
- Moore v. Bryant, 348 F.3d 238 (7th Cir.) (erroneous sentencing advice can be deficient when attorney fails to review governing law)
- Ward v. Jenkins, 613 F.3d 692 (7th Cir.) (prejudice in plea context focuses on whether defendant would have chosen trial)
- Quintana v. Chandler, 723 F.3d 849 (7th Cir.) (standard of review for district-court factual findings in habeas evidentiary hearings)
- State v. Machner, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Wis. Ct. App.) (state procedure for postconviction ineffective-assistance hearings)