Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144

Michael Currier was indicted in Virginia for burglary, grand larceny, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (felon‑in‑possession). Prior burglary/larceny convictions were probative of the felon‑in‑possession charge.
To avoid jury prejudice from admitting prior convictions in the first trial, Currier and the Commonwealth jointly requested a severance: try burglary and larceny first, then try the felon‑in‑possession charge separately.
The jury acquitted Currier at the first trial (burglary and larceny). The Commonwealth then proceeded to try Currier on the severed felon‑in‑possession charge.
Currier moved to dismiss or, alternatively, to bar relitigation of issues decided in his favor at the first trial (issue preclusion under the Double Jeopardy Clause). The trial court denied relief; Currier was convicted in the second trial.
The Virginia Court of Appeals and the Virginia Supreme Court (summary) affirmed; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether consent to severance forecloses double‑jeopardy/issue‑preclusion claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Currier)	Defendant's Argument (Virginia / Majority)	Held
Whether proceeding to the second trial after a defendant‑requested severance violates the Double Jeopardy Clause	Currier: Severance did not waive Ashe‑style issue preclusion; the acquittals necessarily decided he did not participate in the break‑in, so retrying related issues (or admitting evidence) was barred	Commonwealth / Majority: A defendant who requests severance voluntarily chooses two trials; precedent (Jeffers, Dinitz, Scott) bars a double‑jeopardy complaint based on that choice	Held for Commonwealth: Consent to severance precludes a double‑jeopardy bar to the second trial (Parts I–II)
Whether civil issue‑preclusion (collateral estoppel) principles should be imported broadly into criminal double jeopardy to bar relitigation of issues or evidence at a subsequent criminal trial	Currier: Ashe established issue preclusion as a constitutional protection; that protection should prevent relitigation of issues decided in an earlier acquittal	Majority: Double Jeopardy Clause text, history, and modern tests focus on offenses (Blockburger) not broad issue preclusion; Dowling and other decisions limit Ashe’s reach; importing civil preclusion poses doctrinal and practical problems	Held for Commonwealth: Court declines to expand/import civil issue‑preclusion into the Double Jeopardy Clause (Part III)

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (recognized issue‑preclusion component of Double Jeopardy when an acquittal necessarily decided an ultimate fact)
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977) (defendant who elects separate trials cannot later claim double jeopardy when separate trials were his choice)
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976) (defendant’s request for mistrial or other voluntary actions can foreclose double‑jeopardy claims)
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (Double Jeopardy does not relieve a defendant from consequences of voluntary choices that lead to reprosecution)
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (double jeopardy identity‑of‑elements test to determine same offense)
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990) (declined to extend Ashe to bar introduction of otherwise admissible evidence of an acquitted offense)
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009) (reaffirmed Ashe’s demanding standard: acquittal bars relitigation only when an issue was necessarily decided)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (greater/lesser‑included offense rule in double jeopardy analysis)
Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971) (applied Ashe to bar relitigation after acquittal)
Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013) (an acquittal, even if erroneous, is a final judgment against reprosecution)