Cupps v. Mitchell, 182 So. 3d 495

Background

Officer Brandon Brown (City of Fultondale) pursued a blue Mitsubishi Eclipse after a BOLO for a suspected theft; pursuit occurred through multiple roadways and intersections.
Pursued driver (Mitchell) ran several red lights, drove recklessly at high speeds, and ultimately struck Pamela Cupps’ vehicle, killing her and injuring David Cupps.
Plaintiffs (estates of Pamela and David Cupps) sued Mitchell and Officer Brown, alleging negligent/wanton pursuit and statutory violations (including § 32-5A-7(c)).
Brown moved for summary judgment asserting State-agent immunity and § 6-5-338 statutory immunity; he submitted an affidavit describing the pursuit, activation of lights/siren, and that he ceased pursuit when ordered by a supervisor.
Plaintiffs opposed, relying on trial testimony and supervisor depositions to argue Brown violated departmental pursuit policy, was unaware of policy, exceeded safe speeds, failed to turn off lights when terminating pursuit, and proximately caused the collision.
Trial court denied summary judgment; Alabama Supreme Court granted mandamus, holding Brown was entitled to immunity and directing the trial court to enter summary judgment for Brown.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Brown qualifies for State-agent / § 6-5-338 immunity	Cupps: genuine factual disputes (policy violations, lack of due care, proximate cause) preclude immunity	Brown: acting within line and scope of employment performing discretionary law‑enforcement functions; prima facie entitlement to immunity	Held: Brown made prima facie showing; plaintiff failed to raise a substantial factual dispute to defeat immunity
Whether Brown acted "beyond his authority" by violating detailed departmental rules	Cupps: Brown disobeyed pursuit policy (failed checklist duties; unaware of policy; failed to terminate properly)	Brown: policy provides discretionary guidelines, not mandatory checklist; no substantial evidence he breached detailed rules	Held: Policy is guideline with discretion; Cupps did not show a detailed‑rule violation creating Cranman exception
Whether violation of § 32-5A-7 (due‑regard / audible signal) removes immunity	Cupps: Brown exceeded speed, did not display/turn off required signals, drove without due regard	Brown: complied with audible/visual signals; exercise of privilege allowed if driven with due regard; no substantial evidence of reckless disregard	Held: No substantial evidence Brown acted without due regard or reckless disregard under statute; immunity not lost
Whether Brown proximately caused the collision	Cupps: Brown’s pursuit contributed to Mitchell’s reckless driving and the crash	Brown: Mitchell’s independent reckless acts were the proximate cause; officer not liable merely because pursuit contributed	Held: Mitchell’s conduct was proximate cause; evidence did not create triable issue that Brown proximately caused crash

Key Cases Cited

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (defining State-agent immunity and exceptions)
Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala. 2000) (distinguishing detailed mandatory rules from discretionary guidelines)
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So.2d 300 (Ala. 2006) (incorporating peace‑officer immunity into Cranman analysis)
Blackwood v. City of Hanceville, 936 So.2d 495 (Ala. 2006) (interpreting § 32‑5A‑7 limits and ‘‘due regard’’ standard)
Doran v. City of Madison, 519 So.2d 1308 (Ala. 1987) (officer not liable for acts of pursued offender absent lack of due care)
Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So.3d 282 (Ala. 2012) (burden shifting when immunity is raised)
Madison v. Weldon, 446 So.2d 21 (Ala. 1984) (police pursuit conduct standard)