51 Cal.App.5th 571
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In February 2009 John W. Martin executed a living trust (the February Trust) naming himself trustee and Robert Cundall as sole beneficiary and successor trustee.
- Section VIII of the February Trust provided revocation/amendment “by delivering to the Trustee and the Successor Trustee an appropriate written revocation or amendment, signed by the Grantor and his attorney, Frances L. Diaz.”
- After a falling-out with Cundall, Martin retained a new attorney, executed a revocation of the February Trust on May 12, 2009 (signed only by Martin), and executed a new May Trust naming Vanessa Mitchell‑Clyde and Ronald Preissman as beneficiaries.
- Martin’s new attorney delivered executed documents to Martin; Martin died in January 2010. Cundall challenged the revocation, arguing the February Trust required Diaz’s signature (a “trust protector”) and that the trust’s method was the exclusive revocation method.
- The trial court found Martin had capacity, found no undue influence, concluded the February Trust did not explicitly make its revocation method exclusive, and held Martin’s statutory revocation under Probate Code §15401(a)(2) was effective. The Court of Appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statutory revocation method (§15401(a)(2)) applies when a trust requires a particular third party (attorney/trust protector) to sign revocation | §15401 inapplicable where trust delegated revocation authority to Diaz; the trust protector must approve revocation | §15401 applies unless the trust explicitly makes its method exclusive; “method” can include who may revoke | The statute applies; “method” may encompass persons with authority; statutory revocation available unless trust explicitly makes another method exclusive |
| Whether the February Trust’s revocation clause explicitly made its method exclusive so as to bar the statutory method | The clause requiring the grantor and his attorney to sign is an explicit, exclusive procedure | The clause does not expressly state exclusivity; specifying a procedure is not the same as expressly making it exclusive | Clause not explicit as to exclusivity; statutory method under §15401(a)(2) available and Martin’s revocation effective |
Key Cases Cited
- Masry v. Masry, 166 Cal.App.4th 738 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (statutory revocation available unless trust explicitly makes instrument’s method exclusive)
- Huscher v. Wells Fargo Bank, 121 Cal.App.4th 956 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (discussed prior rule and explicit v. implicit exclusivity)
- Hibernia Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, 66 Cal.App.3d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (prior-case law favoring trust-specified procedures)
- King v. Lynch, 204 Cal.App.4th 1186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (analysis of statutory scheme governing trust revocation/modification)
- Conservatorship of Irvine, 40 Cal.App.4th 1334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (discussed but not persuasive on exclusivity under §15401)
- Gardenhire v. Superior Court, 127 Cal.App.4th 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (dictum suggesting §15401 inapplicable when trust provides a method; court here rejects that dictum)