668 F. App'x 656
7th Cir.2016Background
- Cullen, an agnostic, pleaded guilty to aggravated DUI and was sentenced to three years; prison offered discretionary good-time credit for completing a substance-abuse program that used a 12-step (AA) model.
- Cullen enrolled but objected to the program’s references to a “higher power”; he completed the program but received no credit because the prison suspended the credit practice before completion; he was released in January 2011.
- In 2012 Cullen sued the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Illinois Department of Human Services, agency administrators, and prison staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking $350 in damages and an injunction to bar AA-based programs.
- The district court dismissed claims against the state agencies as not being “persons” under § 1983 and barred by sovereign immunity, and held Cullen lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he was no longer subject to the program.
- The court held the individual defendants liable on First Amendment grounds (following Kerr v. Farrey), but limited damages to the $350 Cullen repeatedly sought in pleadings and interrogatories, rejecting his belated attempt to seek over $2 million in punitive damages as prejudicial.
- Cullen appealed, challenging agency dismissal, denial of injunctive relief, and the damages award; the Seventh Circuit affirmed on all grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state agencies are "persons" under § 1983 | Agencies are proper defendants under § 1983 | State agencies are not "persons" and sovereign immunity bars suit | Agencies are not § 1983 persons; dismissal affirmed (Will controlling) |
| Standing for injunctive relief after release | Cullen may face future injury if seeking restricted driving privileges and being steered to AA-based programs; seeks injunction requiring secular options | Cullen is no longer subject to program; alleged future injury is speculative | No standing for injunction; fear is too hypothetical (City of Los Angeles v. Lyons) |
| Taxpayer standing to challenge agency promotion of religion | As a taxpayer, Cullen can challenge use of state resources to promote religion | Taxpayer standing not available for discretionary executive expenditures (Hein) | Taxpayer standing rejected; Hein and Seventh Circuit precedent control |
| Damages — limitation to $350 and denial of belated punitive damages | Cullen sought punitive damages after discovery and liability ruling | Defendants relied on Cullen’s repeated sworn statements limiting damages to $350; allowing huge increase would prejudice defendants | Award limited to $350; belated multi-million punitive claim barred as prejudicial under Rule 54(c) principles |
Key Cases Cited
- Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996) (requiring attendance at NA meetings violated inmate’s First Amendment rights)
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (standing for injunctive relief requires immediate risk of future harm)
- Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (taxpayer standing does not extend to discretionary executive expenditures promoting religion)
- Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (courts should grant relief to which a party is entitled but not more when doing so prejudices defendants)
- Kaszuk v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int’l Pension Fund, 791 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1986) (substantial increase in requested relief can prejudice defendants and bar additional relief)
- Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Nicholson, 536 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Hein regarded as controlling in Seventh Circuit on taxpayer standing)
- Sherman v. Illinois, 682 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2012) (taxpayer lacked standing to challenge discretionary executive grant supporting religious activity)