517 F.Supp.3d 1042
E.D. Cal.2021Background
- Plaintiffs (restaurants and other businesses) sued Governor Newsom, state agencies (including ABC), Fresno County and City officials, and former Fresno Mayor Brand challenging COVID-19 restrictions that barred or limited indoor operations.
- FAC asserts federal and state claims: procedural and substantive due process, equal protection, Fifth Amendment takings, and requests class certification, declaratory/injunctive relief and at least $200M in compensation.
- Defendants moved to dismiss: State and ABC invoked Eleventh Amendment immunity and Jacobson-style deference to public-health measures; City and County largely adopted those defenses; County additionally argued it was an arm of the State.
- Court took judicial notice of public pandemic guidance/orders, analyzed immunity (Mitchell factors for county arm-of-state), applicable standard of review (Jacobson v. Massachusetts v. ordinary scrutiny), and merits of Due Process/Equal Protection/Takings claims.
- Rulings summarized: Eleventh Amendment bars money damages against the State and ABC; Ex parte Young permits prospective federal equitable relief against state officials (Gov./AG) only; County not entitled to Eleventh immunity; procedural due process and several other claims dismissed without leave to amend; substantive due process, equal protection, and Fifth Amendment takings claims dismissed with leave to amend (subject to limits and the Court’s reasoning).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eleventh Amendment immunity (State / ABC / officials) | Plaintiffs may seek money and prospective relief against state actors for constitutional violations | State/ABC: Eleventh bars federal suits for money; only Ex parte Young permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials | Money damages dismissed against State/ABC; Ex parte Young allows prospective federal relief against Gov. and AG (not State/ABC); County not an arm of the State under Mitchell factors (no Eleventh immunity) |
| Proper review standard in health emergency (Jacobson) | Jacobson does not displace ordinary constitutional scrutiny; emergency doesn’t lower standards | Defendants: Jacobson affords deference; courts should uphold public-health measures unless plainly unrelated to public health or a palpable rights invasion | Court: normal constitutional standards apply (no separate Jacobson test); Jacobson cited but does not supplant ordinary scrutiny; deference to public-health judgments acknowledged in merits review |
| Procedural due process (Fourteenth Amendment) | Orders deprived plaintiffs of liberty/property (right to operate, travel) without pre- or post-deprivation hearings | Orders are legislative in nature affecting large classes; Halverson: legislative acts do not require individual hearings | Procedural due process claim dismissed without leave to amend (government action deemed legislative) |
| Substantive due process (right to pursue business/ work) | Shutdowns amount to conscience‑shocking deprivation of right to work/commerce | Right to pursue a trade is not fundamental; restrictions are temporary and allow outdoor/other operations; rational basis applies | Substantive due process dismissed but with leave to amend (court finds no fundamental right alleged and applies rational-basis review; amendment permitted narrowly) |
| Equal protection (differential indoor‑operation rules by county/essential status) | Classifications (essential vs non‑essential; county tiers) are arbitrary, irrational, not based on science | Tiered restrictions rationally relate to county transmission metrics and sector risk; permissible line‑drawing | Equal protection claim dismissed with leave to amend (court applies rational-basis review and finds plausible state rationale) |
| Fifth Amendment Takings (inverse condemnation / compensation) | Orders effectively took property/use and require compensation | Eleventh bars inverse‑condemnation damages against the State; no physical occupation; at most regulatory impact governed by Penn Central; equitable relief inappropriate when compensation is available | Takings claim dismissed in part: monetary takings claims barred as to State; regulatory‑takings theory insufficiently pleaded; dismissal of takings claim with leave to amend limited to non‑barred defendants (Court permits amendment on Penn Central theory but disfavors shotgun pleading) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (public‑health laws sustained unless no real relation to health ends or they plainly invade constitutional rights)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permits prospective injunctive relief against state officials to vindicate federal rights)
- Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and state agencies are not "persons" under § 1983 for money damages)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (ad hoc three‑factor test for regulatory takings)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (clarified regulatory takings analysis and standards)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (categorical taking where regulation deprives owner of all economically beneficial use)
- Knick v. Township of Scott, Pa., 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (landowner may bring federal takings claim without exhausting state remedies)
- Halverson v. Skagit County, 42 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 1994) (legislative actions affecting large groups do not require individual procedural hearings)
- Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2009) (temporary interruptions of a calling do not necessarily implicate substantive due process)
- Ray v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2019) (Mitchell factors applied to determine whether a county is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes)
- Mitchell v. Los Angeles County Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1988) (five‑factor test for arm‑of‑the‑state status)