Cuc Phuoc Ho v. State
44415
| Idaho Ct. App. | Nov 14, 2017Background
- Ho pled guilty in 2004 to distribution of marijuana and possession of a controlled substance; judgment was withheld and he received probation. He filed a motion to set aside those pleas in 2007 (never ruled) and again in 2012 (granted June 14, 2012).
- On May 17, 2012 Ho possessed firearms; he pled guilty in 2013 to unlawful possession of a firearm and received a suspended prison term and probation.
- In 2015 immigration authorities detained Ho as an aggravated felon, prompting Ho to seek post-conviction relief on June 20, 2016 alleging three ineffective-assistance claims: (1) counsel failed to advise on immigration consequences of the 2013 plea; (2) counsel advised the 2013 plea based on belief the 2004 conviction would be dismissed; and (3) counsel failed to obtain a hearing on the 2007 motion to set aside the 2004 pleas.
- The district court expedited the post-conviction proceeding, held an evidentiary hearing, and granted relief: it vacated the 2013 guilty plea and conviction.
- The State appealed, arguing the petition was untimely under I.C. § 19-4902(a) and that the district court misapplied statutory exceptions/tolling doctrines. The appellate court reversed, concluding the petition was untimely and the district court erred in applying exceptions.
Issues
| Issue | Ho's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether petition was timely under I.C. § 19-4902(a) | Petition was timely because consequences (deportation) only recently arose, so filing deadline should be tolled | Petition was filed after the one-year statutory trigger dates for both convictions and is untimely | Untimely; one-year limit applies and petition was filed late |
| Whether I.C. § 19-4901(b) exception removes the one-year limit | § 19-4901(b) creates an exception that allows revival of forfeited claims without the one-year bar | § 19-4901(b) only addresses forfeiture of issues not raised on direct appeal and does not negate the § 19-4902(a) one-year limit | § 19-4901(b) does not negate the one-year time bar; it’s a narrow exception to forfeiture, not to timeliness |
| Whether filing deadline is triggered when collateral consequences are felt (equitable tolling) | Deadline should be tolled until harmful immigration consequences materialize; petitioner could not know earlier | Time to file is not triggered by remote collateral consequences; tolling is allowed only in exceptional, specified circumstances | Rejected consequences-as-trigger theory; equitable tolling available only in narrow, exceptional situations and not on this basis |
| Whether counsel was ineffective per Padilla (immigration advice) | Counsel failed under Padilla to advise about deportation consequences, so plea was involuntary | Even if Padilla applies, procedural default/time bar prevents relief here | Court did not reach Padilla merits because petition was procedurally untimely; timeliness dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (counsel must advise about clear deportation consequences of guilty plea)
- Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009) (equitable tolling and due-process considerations in post-conviction context)
- Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64 (Ct. App. 2011) (post-conviction petition must be supported by admissible evidence or it is subject to dismissal)