Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 369 F. Supp. 3d 164

Background

Plaintiffs (conservation organizations and a safari guide) challenged FWS Country‑wide 2017 enhancement and non‑detriment findings for elephants and lions as procedurally defective under the APA and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Service issued a March memorandum withdrawing the 2017 country‑wide findings and many prior country‑wide enhancement/non‑detriment findings, announcing it would make such determinations case‑by‑case in permit adjudications.
Plaintiffs amended to challenge (a) the 2017 findings themselves (claims 1–6), (b) the March Memo’s rescission of prior findings without notice‑and‑comment (claim 7), and (c) the Memo’s shift to case‑by‑case decisions as a substantive policy change requiring notice‑and‑comment (claim 8).
Defendants (federal and intervenor) moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing the challenged 2017 findings were withdrawn (mootness), plaintiffs lack standing for many claims, and the rescission and withdrawal were lawful given binding D.C. Circuit precedent.
The court held claims 1–6 moot because the 2017 findings were withdrawn; rejected plaintiffs’ mootness exceptions; found plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge withdrawal of positive findings and the switch to case‑by‑case determinations; and dismissed claim 7 (rescission) for failure to state a claim as to the negative findings the plaintiffs could plausibly challenge.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are claims challenging the 2017 country‑wide findings justiciable?	The findings were unlawful and should be set aside.	The findings were withdrawn by the March Memo, so there is no live controversy.	Dismissed as moot (claims 1–6); withdrawal prevents meaningful relief; mootness exceptions inapplicable.
Do plaintiffs have standing to challenge the March Memo’s rescission of positive enhancement findings?	Rescission without notice harms plaintiffs because it signals continued reliance and harms species they protect.	Withdrawal removes the authorization that enabled trophy imports; plaintiffs therefore lack injury from rescission.	No standing for positive findings; plaintiffs show no injury in fact.
Can plaintiffs challenge rescission of negative (prohibitory) findings without notice‑and‑comment?	Rescission of negative findings increases risk to species and harms members (procedural injury).	Many withdrawn negative findings are time‑limited or were properly withdrawn following Circuit precedent; rescission did not cause cognizable, redressable injury.	Plaintiffs plausibly allege standing as to some negative findings with continuing effect (e.g., 2015 Zimbabwe), but claims dismissed on the merits: withdrawal was corrective after D.C. Circuit found procedures defective; no §553 violation requiring notice‑and‑comment to repeal.
Do plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Memo’s announced shift to case‑by‑case permit determinations as a substantive policy change requiring notice‑and‑comment?	The change prevents public notice/comment and forces organizational resource burdens (FOIA, more advocacy) that injure missions.	The change is neutral with respect to substantive outcomes; alleged resource burdens are advocacy costs and insufficient for organizational standing.	No standing; organizational injury is speculative or limited to advocacy costs, which do not confer Article III standing.

Key Cases Cited

Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (pleading standards; courts accept factual allegations and reasonable inferences)
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (pleading and Rule 12(b)(6) standards)
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (U.S. 1997) (Article III requires an ongoing case or controversy)
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1968) (limits on advisory opinions)
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (U.S. 1969) (case or controversy must remain live throughout litigation)
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 680 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (agency corrective action can moot a case)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1998) (courts should not pronounce on past actions without continuing effect)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing requirements: injury‑in‑fact, causation, redressability)
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (U.S. 1997) (procedural‑rights standing and pleading requirements)
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2000) (voluntary cessation doctrine and standing principles)
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F.3d 174 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (procedural‑injury standing; causation and redressability links)
Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (standing at pleadings stage; organizational standing limits)