CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood Homeowner's Association, Inc.
461 S.W.3d 627
Tex. App.2015Background
- This is the third interlocutory certificate-of-merit appeal between CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC and Starwood Homeowner’s Association, Inc.
- CTL’s second dismissal motion targeted Starwood’s claims for failure to file an adequate certificate of merit; the trial court denied the motion
- Starwood nonsuited its claims in the prior suit, and CTL’s first motion to dismiss was addressed on remand after Texas Supreme Court review
- CTL argued Starwood’s earlier certificate of merit remained inadequate, seeking dismissal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §150.002(e)
- On remand, the trial court ultimately denied CTL’s second motion to dismiss the claims in the pending suit, prompting this interlocutory appeal
- The court held that a dismissal under §150.002(e) may be without prejudice and affirmed the denial of CTL’s second motion to dismiss
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §150.002(e) permits a dismissal without prejudice | Starwood contends the statute allows without-prejudice dismissal to provide a second opportunity to comply | CTL contends dismissal without prejudice is not authorized by §150.002(e) and should be with prejudice or automatic refiling were precluded | No; §150.002(e) permits dismissal without prejudice; CTL’s argument is overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637 (Tex.2009) (dismissal with prejudice is an adjudication; without prejudice is not)
- Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex.2010) (dismissal without prejudice may permit refiling)
- Bruington Eng’g, Ltd. v. Pedernal Energy, L.L.C., 403 S.W.3d 523 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2013) (construes §150.002(a) first-filed requirement)
- Pakal Enters., Inc. v. Lesak Enters. LLC, 369 S.W.3d 224 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011) (first-filed complaint requirement with §150.002(a))
- Sharp Eng’g v. Luis, 321 S.W.3d 748 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) (construction of 'may' in statutes)
- Seguin v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., 373 S.W.3d 699 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2012) (statutory interpretation—permissive vs mandatory)
- Cheng v. Wang, 315 S.W.3d 668 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2010) (permissive construction of statutory provisions)
- Jaster v. Comet II Constr, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 (Tex.2014) (read words in context when construing statutes)
- Lexington Ins. Co. v. Strayhorn, 209 S.W.3d 83 (Tex.2006) (statutory construction guiding principles)
- Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54 (Tex.2011) (statutory intent as polestar of construction)