CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC
233 Ariz. 355
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Loop 101 borrowed $15.6M from MidFirst in 2007; loan secured by deed of trust; four guarantors signed guaranties. After default, MidFirst assigned the loan to CSA, which credit‑bid $6.15M at a trustee’s sale; about $11.2M remained on the loan. CSA sued for a deficiency.
- The deed of trust and guaranty contained language purporting to waive any right to a fair‑market‑value hearing under A.R.S. § 33‑814(A) and to treat the trustee’s sale price as conclusively the fair market value.
- Loop 101 and the guarantors requested a § 33‑814(A) determination; the trial court held a hearing and found fair market value = $12.5M, eliminating any deficiency.
- CSA moved for summary judgment arguing the parties had contractually waived the § 33‑814(A) entitlement; the trial court denied CSA’s motions, granted Loop 101’s cross‑motion, and entered judgment for Loop 101 and the guarantors.
- CSA appealed; the appellate court affirmed, holding the statutory fair‑market‑value protection under § 33‑814(A) cannot be waived in advance and that the trial court’s valuation and procedural rulings were correct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (CSA) | Defendant's Argument (Loop 101/Guarantors) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether parties may waive the § 33‑814(A) right to a judicial fair‑market‑value hearing | Waiver language in deed and guaranty clearly relinquishes right; waiver enforces contract terms | Statutory right is protected by the deed‑of‑trust statutory scheme and cannot be waived in advance | § 33‑814(A) protection cannot be waived; waiver unenforceable |
| Whether trial court’s § 33‑814(A) valuation ($12.5M) was supported by evidence | Valuation relied on improper evidence and improperly discounted REO sales | Court considered multiple appraisals and evidence; CSA introduced some of the challenged evidence | Valuation sustained; substantial evidence supports $12.5M finding |
| Whether prior judge’s recusal required vacatur of prior rulings | Recusal created appearance of impropriety, so prior rulings should be vacated | No evidence of impropriety; recusal was timely and permissible | Denial of motion to vacate affirmed; no appearance of impropriety shown |
| Timeliness and availability of CSA’s summary judgment motion after valuation | Motion timely and should have been granted if waiver effective | Motion was untimely and, in any event, waiver is invalid so summary judgment not warranted | Even assuming timeliness, denial proper because waiver is invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- Verma v. Stuhr, 223 Ariz. 144 (App. 2009) (defines waiver and limits when statutory rights may be waived)
- McClellan Mortg. Co. v. Storey, 146 Ariz. 185 (App. 1985) (statutory protections can sometimes be waived; discusses limits)
- Patton v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 118 Ariz. 473 (1978) (deed‑of‑trust statutes strictly construed in favor of borrower)
- In re Krohn, 203 Ariz. 205 (2002) (explains policy placing risk of below‑market trustee’s sale on mortgagee; cites Restatement support)
- Mid‑First Bank v. Chase, 230 Ariz. 366 (App. 2012) (trustee’s sale price may not reflect fair market value; supports § 33‑814 purpose)
- Brown v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 194 Ariz. 85 (App. 1998) (a party that introduces evidence cannot later complain about its admission)
- Flood Control Dist. v. Fling, 147 Ariz. 292 (App. 1985) (appellate court will not reweigh conflicting testimony)
- Sholes v. Fernando, 228 Ariz. 455 (App. 2011) (appellate review will not disturb valuation supported by substantial evidence)
- Zuniga v. Superior Court (Bernstein), 77 Ariz. 222 (1954) (judge may recuse on own motion even if not legally compelled)
- Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Arizona, 211 Ariz. 282 (2005) (discusses permissible judicial recusal on non‑compelled grounds)
