Crystal Dixon v. University of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269

Dixon was Interim Associate Vice President for Human Resources at the University of Toledo when she was terminated on May 8, 2008.
She wrote an op-ed in the Toledo Free Press criticizing the Civil Rights movement analogy to LGBT rights and was subsequently placed on paid administrative leave.
Dixon responded with a second op-ed defending her views but did not disclose her University position in the piece.
The University sent termination based on public statements conflicting with University policies and core values, raising concerns about leadership in a critical function.
Dixon sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation, equal-protection, and related claims; the district court awarded summary judgment for the University and officials, which Dixon appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dixon’s speech was protected by the First Amendment.	Dixon argues her op-ed addressed public concerns and was protected.	The Rose presumption applies; as a policymaker, her speech is not protected.	Rose presumption applies; speech not protected.
Whether Dixon, as a policymaker, falls within the Rose presumption.	Dixon contends she had no policy-making authority to affect university policy.	Dixon occupied a policymaking role with significant discretionary authority over HR policies.	Dixon was a category-two policymaker; presumption applies.
Whether the district court properly applied Pickering/Garcetti analysis after Rose.	If Rose does not apply, Pickering balancing should decide protection.	Rose controls outcome; no need for Pickering/Garcetti analysis.	Rose presumption dispositive; no need for Pickering/Garcetti analysis.
Whether the equal-protection claim survives given the First Amendment ruling.	Disparate treatment for viewpoint constitutes equal protection violation.	No similarly situated individuals proven; speech not protected.	Equal-protection claim insufficient; affirmed dismissal.
Whether the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.	Rights were violated by termination for protected speech.	No constitutional rights violation established.	Qualified immunity affirmed; no rights violation shown.

Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2002) (presumption that policymaking public employees' speech is not protected)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (public employee speech on matters of public concern requires balancing)
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1968) (balancing of employee speech vs. government efficiency)
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (speech made pursuant to official duties not protected)
Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2006) (elements of First Amendment retaliation claim)
Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010) (additional framework for public-employee speech cases)
Latham v. Office of Attorney Gen. of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2005) (policymaking considerations in identifying protected speech)
Hager v. Pike Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 286 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2002) (policymaking status inquiry for the Rose framework)
Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2006) (application of Rose to policymaking/communications)