Cruz v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., PR, Inc., 699 F.3d 563

Cruz, Lasanta, and Diaz were terminated from Bristol-Myers during a broad site wind-down; Cruz received a three-, six-, or nine-month bonus depending on discharge timing.
Bristol-Myers adopted an ERISA severance plan; Cruz did not sign a release and thus did not receive severance.
The district court granted summary judgment to Bristol-Myers on all claims; appellants challenged severance-related and other statutory claims.
Plaintiffs asserted ERISA, ADEA, ADA, WARN, COBRA, Puerto Rico Law 100, and Law 80 claims; Diaz and Lasanta were severed from the case.
Cruz sought amendments and class/collective action certification; the district court denied and later the case proceeded against Cruz alone for summary judgment.
Court reviewed in light of joinder, collective action certification standards, and Rule 16(b) good-cause amendment requirements; ultimately affirmed the district court’s rulings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether severing Diaz and Lasanta was an abuse of discretion	Cruz argues common interests justify joinder.	Bristol-Myers contends lack of common questions; severance appropriate.	No abuse; severance upheld.
Whether the district court properly denied ADEA collective action certification	Plaintiffs claimed they were similarly situated and benefited from collective action.	Defendants argued minimal, conclusory showing; not sufficiently similarly situated.	No abuse; certification denied.
Whether Cruz's belated amendments to the complaint were properly denied	Amendments would add claims/information from discovery to support relief.	Delay and lack of good cause under Rule 16(b)(4); amendments warranted denial.	No abuse; amendments denied.
Whether the ADEA claim withstands summary judgment	Cruz contends age was a motivating factor.	Ranking-based layoff and older employees retained undermines discrimination claim.	Claim failed; no evidence of age-based discrimination; summary judgment affirmed.
Whether the Law 100/Law 80 claims and the ERISA claim were properly resolved	Exhaustion and plan bona fides disputed; severance rights misinterpreted.	Exhaustion required for ERISA; just cause for termination supported; Law 80/100 defenses upheld.	ERISA exhaustion and alternative Puerto Rico claims rejected; summary judgment affirmed.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court, 1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework in discrimination cases)
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court, 2009) (but-for causation standard in ADEA)
Velázquez-Fernández v. NCE Foods, Inc., 476 F.3d 6 (1st Cir., 2007) (burden of persuasion under Law 100/80 scheme)
Baralt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 10 (1st Cir., 2001) (Law 100/80 just cause standard guidance)
Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir., 2008) (test for similarly situated in ADEA collective actions)
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir., 2001) (abuse-of-discretion standard for collective action certification)
Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888 (6th Cir., 2003) (diligence and scheduling deadlines in amendment decisions)
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604 (9th Cir., 1992) (importance of scheduling orders and diligence in amendments)
O'Connell v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., 357 F.3d 152 (1st Cir., 2004) (Rule 16(b) good cause standard; diligence requirement)
Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (Supreme Court, 1989) (collective action policy under ADEA)
Madera v. Marsh USA, Inc., 426 F.3d 56 (1st Cir., 2005) (ERISA exhaustion requirement)
Ríos-Jiménez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31 (1st Cir., 2008) (summary judgment consideration; admissibility of SUF admissions)