Crumplar v. Superior Court ex rel. New Castle County
2012 Del. LEXIS 553
| Del. | 2012Background
- Crumplar appeals Superior Court Rule 11 sanctions for sua sponte action; two show-cause orders issued for alleged misrepresentation and failure to distinguish precedent; First Order involved misnaming a case (McNulty) in support of a proposition; Crumplar later identified the correct case as Opalczynski after staff review and opposing counsel clarification.
- Second Order addressed Crumplar’s briefs in a summary judgment motion, noting failure to distinguish controlling preexisting asbestos cases (Rotter, Dieterle, Weber) that opposing counsel had cited.
- The Superior Court imposed a $25,000 sanction under Rule 11(b) based on both orders, but emphasized the burden of asbestos litigation and claimed Crumplar attempted to mislead the court.
- Crumplar argued Rule 11 applies an objective standard rather than subjective good faith, and that the judge erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing or allowing oral argument; the court denied due process concerns.
- This Court adopts an objective standard for Rule 11 sanctions and extends Infotechnology to require that sanctions for attorney conduct only occur where there is prejudicial disruption of the proceedings; the Court vacates the sanctions and remands for appropriate process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 11 uses an objective or subjective standard | Crumplar argues for objective (reasonableness under circumstances) standard | Superior Court had used subjective good-faith standard | Objective standard applies |
| Whether Crumplar violated Rule 11 under objective standard | Crumplar reasonably believed McNulty/Opalczynski supported his position | Court found misrepresentation and failure to distinguish precedent | Sanctions were abused; conduct did not meet objective standard |
| Whether due process required an evidentiary hearing | Sua sponte sanctions require a hearing | Written orders sufficed under Rule 11 | Hearing required; due process violated by lack of oral response opportunity and ability-to-pay inquiry |
| Extent of court’s power to sanction under Rule 11 | Infotechnology limits court’s extra-disciplinary enforcement; seek disciplinary referral for misconduct | Rule 11 sanctions are within trial court's control repeated | Extend Infotechnology; sanctions vacated; refer to Disciplinary Counsel if appropriate |
| Process safeguards for sua sponte Rule 11 actions | Right to response and hearing; consider ability to pay if monetary sanctions | Current process adequate | Require a hearing, and assess ability to pay; avoid overbroad monetary sanctions |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Infotechnology, Inc., 582 A.2d 215 (Del. 1990) (trial court power limited to prejudicial disruption; not extra-disciplinary)
- Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985) (reasonableness under the circumstances; duty to conduct reasonable inquiry)
- Singer v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 311 A.2d 859 (Del. 1973) (good faith standard prior to amendments)
- In re DeVille, 361 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 2004) (advisory guidance on Rule 11 procedures)
- In re Reardon, 759 A.2d 568 (Del. 2000) (discussion of professional conduct supervision and disciplinary process)
- Waters, 647 A.2d 1091 (Del. 1994) (prejudice required to enforce rules via sanctions)