Crump v. Lafler
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Crump pled guilty in 2001 to third-degree criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced to 3 to 22.5 years; he also received a consecutive 7 to 20 year sentence for possession with intent to deliver cocaine.
- In 2008 Crump became parole-eligible; the Michigan Parole Board scored him as high probability of parole (+3) but denied parole for 18 months after a July 2008 interview.
- The Board’s decision notice cited risk factors, need for sex offender therapy, lack of insight/remorse, and listed corrective-action recommendations.
- Crump filed an 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition (August 2008) arguing the denial violated due process by relying on outdated or insufficient record evidence.
- Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal for lack of a state-created entitlement; District Court adopted the recommendation, dismissed the petition, and denied a COA; Crump appealed.
- The issue was whether Michigan’s parole system creates a federal due-process liberty interest in parole; the court applied de novo review because the claim had not been previously adjudicated in state court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Michigan parole creates a cognizable liberty interest. | Crump asserts a lawful entitlement to parole under Michigan’s system. | Lafler contends no liberty interest exists; parole is not guaranteed and depends on broad Board discretion. | No liberty interest exists for Crump under Michigan law. |
| Does Michigan’s high-probability designation create a presumption of release? | The classification with high probability of parole generates a presumption of release. | The designation is not a guaranteed release; parole remains discretionary. | Classification alone does not create a due-process entitlement; no liberty interest is established. |
| Does Michigan’s statutory scheme with 1996 amendments affect Sweeton’s holding? | Amendments may have created a liberty interest by restricting Board discretion. | Sweeton remains controlling to show no entitlement. | Sweeton remains persuasive; defendant prevails on this issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (parole statutes with mandatory language create presumption of release when conditions are met)
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Ctr., 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (parole schemes with mandatory release presumption invoke due-process protections)
- Roth v. United States, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (liberty interests require legitimate entitlement, not mere desire)
- Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162 (1994) (Michigan parole system does not create a liberty interest given broad discretion (en banc))
- Mayes v. Trammell, 751 F.2d 175 (1984) (parole regulations may create entitlement where there is an explicit presumption of release)
- Allen v. Montana Bd. of Pardons, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (parole schemes with mandatory language can create entitlement when facts are favorable)
- Caldwell v. McNutt, 158 Fed. Appx. 739 (2006) (amendments did not alter Sweeton’s holding on liberty interest)
- Carnes v. Engler, 76 Fed. Appx. 79 (2003) (unpublished decision supporting Michigan lack of liberty interest)