Crozier v. Brownell-Talbot School
25 Neb. Ct. App. 1
| Neb. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Crozier applied for and received a written offer from Brownell for "Director of Communications and Marketing" on April 28, 2014; she signed and returned the offer on April 29 and Brownell announced her hire on May 1, 2014.
- The offer letter described the role as a "twelve-month position" with an "annual salary of $55,000.00" and also specified dates "beginning May 5, 2014 to June 30, 2015," creating conflicting duration language.
- A newspaper article about problems at Crozier’s former employer ran on May 2, 2014; the article did not name Crozier or give dates tying the problems to her tenure.
- After Crozier explained to Brownell that she had resigned earlier and had reported the prior employer’s problems, Brownell rescinded the offer the same day, citing public relations and reputational concerns.
- Crozier sued for breach of contract; the district court granted Brownell’s motion for summary judgment, finding the offer ambiguous (so at-will presumed) and that Brownell had good cause to revoke.
- The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding genuine issues of material fact exist on (1) whether the offer created a definite-term employment contract and (2) whether Brownell had good cause to revoke the offer.
Issues
| Issue | Crozier's Argument | Brownell's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the offer letter create a definite-term employment contract (vs. at-will)? | The letter’s dated term (May 5, 2014–June 30, 2015) shows a definite-term contract. | Language is ambiguous; no clear meeting of minds so at-will presumption stands. | Ambiguity exists; whether it created a definite-term contract is a factual question for the factfinder. Summary judgment inappropriate. |
| Are the offer letter’s duration terms ambiguous and open to parol evidence? | The written dates show a defined term; extrinsic evidence supports that intent. | The conflicting phrasing ("twelve-month" vs. the dates) supports multiple interpretations. | Court: The terms are facially ambiguous; parol evidence can be considered; interpretation is a fact issue. |
| Did Brownell have good cause to revoke the offer? | No—article did not implicate Crozier; she had resigned before alleged incidents and had reported them. | Yes—Brownell reasonably feared reputational/public-relations harm from hiring her. | Whether Brownell had good cause is a genuine factual dispute; summary judgment improper. |
| Was summary judgment appropriate for either party? | Crozier argued partial summary judgment should be granted in her favor. | Brownell argued it was entitled to summary judgment. | Reversed district court: genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment for either side; remanded. |
Key Cases Cited
- O'Brien v. Bellevue Pub. Schools, 289 Neb. 637 (2014) (summary judgment standard)
- Davenport Ltd. P’ship v. 75th & Dodge I, L.P., 279 Neb. 615 (2010) (contract ambiguity and parol evidence principles)
- David Fiala, Ltd. v. Harrison, 290 Neb. 418 (2015) (definition of contractual ambiguity)
- Schwindt v. Dynamic Air, Inc., 243 Neb. 600 (1993) (ambiguity and jury determination of contract meaning)
- Schuessler v. Benchmark Mktg. & Consulting, 243 Neb. 425 (1993) (defined-term employment requires good cause for termination)
- Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 273 Neb. 855 (2007) (at-will employment presumption)
- Pierce v. Landmark Mgmt. Group, 293 Neb. 890 (2016) (when facts permit only one reasonable conclusion, question may be decided as a matter of law)