Crown v. Danby Fire District
676 F. App'x 87
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Adam Crown, a volunteer firefighter for Danby Fire District, filed a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim alleging constructive discharge after disciplinary charges and pressure to resign.
- Crown had complained about training, officer safety, and access to records; he also used a copy of the Fire Chief’s signature to enroll in a course, which defendants said violated municipal law.
- Crown previously pursued an administrative proceeding through the NY Department of Labor and the Industrial Board of Appeals (IBA), which found the District’s stated reason for preparing charges was pretextual; that proceeding was directed against the Commissioner of Labor, not the Danby defendants.
- The district court granted summary judgment to individual defendants on qualified immunity grounds and to municipal defendants on Monell grounds; it denied Crown’s motion for partial summary judgment based on the IBA decision.
- The Second Circuit reviewed collateral estoppel application, qualified immunity, and municipal (Monell) liability and remanded in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IBA decision collaterally estops defendants from relitigating pretext | IBA already decided the District’s stated reason was pretextual; that should bind defendants | IBA proceeding was against DOL, not defendants; defendants lacked privity and full opportunity to litigate | Affirmed denial of collateral estoppel — no privity, so IBA decision does not bind defendants |
| Whether individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity | Crown argues disciplinary acts were retaliation for protected speech (training/safety criticisms) | Defendants argue they reasonably believed discipline was lawful (unauthorized signature, insubordination) | Qualified immunity inappropriate at summary judgment given disputed facts; vacated district court grant |
| Whether temporal remoteness defeats causation for retaliation claim | Crown: recent complaints/e-mails and proximity to resignation permit inference of causation | Defendants: complaint timing and remoteness preclude causal inference | Court: temporal and factual context could support causation; unresolved fact issues preclude summary judgment |
| Whether municipal defendants liable under Monell | Crown: Board’s authorization and actions were official policymaker acts, no comparator needed | Municipal defendants: lack of comparator firefighters treated better defeats claim | Vacated grant of summary judgment to municipal defendants — Board actions could constitute municipal policy supporting Monell liability |
Key Cases Cited
- Matusick v. Erie Cty. Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31 (2d Cir.) (federal review of collateral-estoppel conclusions applying state law)
- Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979) (firefighter criticisms about training/discipline can be matters of public concern)
- Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 834 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1987) (limitations on access to public records can be protected speech)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom attributable to the municipality)
- Buechel v. Bain, 97 N.Y.2d 295 (N.Y.) (definition and limits of privity for collateral estoppel under New York law)
- Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir.) (temporal proximity is not a bright-line test for causation in retaliation claims)