303 F. Supp. 3d 564
E.D. Mich.2018Background
- Plaintiffs are victims and family members of victims of the June 12, 2016 Pulse Night Club mass shooting by Omar Mateen; they sued three social‑media companies alleging the platforms enabled ISIS propaganda that radicalized Mateen.
- Plaintiffs pleaded federal claims under the Anti‑Terrorism Act (18 U.S.C. § 2333) including aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and material‑support theories (18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B), plus Michigan state tort claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death.
- Allegations: ISIS used defendants’ platforms to post recruitment/propaganda videos and generated ad revenue; Mateen viewed jihadist material online and later pledged allegiance to ISIS; ISIS later claimed responsibility via Amaq and al‑Bayan after the attack.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing CDA § 230 immunity and that plaintiffs failed to plead essential elements (international terrorism, aiding/conspiracy/material support, and proximate causation).
- The court accepted the complaint allegations as true for the motion to dismiss but held plaintiffs failed to plead facts plausibly showing the attack was an "act of international terrorism," that defendants knowingly and substantially assisted Mateen or ISIS with respect to this attack, or that defendants proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries.
- The court granted the motion and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to allege plausible federal or state claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Pulse attack qualifies as an "act of international terrorism" under § 2331(1) | Mateen was radicalized by ISIS content on defendants' platforms; because ISIS is a foreign terrorist org, Mateen's attack was an act of international terrorism | The attack was a domestic act by a lone actor with no pleaded transnational means, intent to intimidate foreign persons, or direction from ISIS | Court: Not pleaded plausibly under § 2331(1)(C); allegations show only consumption of internet content, not the required transnational nexus or ISIS direction |
| Whether defendants can be liable for aiding and abetting an act of international terrorism under JASTA/§ 2333(d) | Platforms knowingly provided substantial assistance to ISIS’ radicalization efforts that led to the attack | Plaintiffs did not allege defendants knowingly and substantially assisted Mateen or were aware they were assuming a role in terrorism | Court: Plaintiffs failed to plead facts showing defendants were generally aware of their role or provided substantial assistance to the principal (Mateen) |
| Whether defendants provided criminal "material support" to Mateen or to ISIS in a way that proximately caused the attack (§§ 2339A/2339B) | By enabling ISIS to publish propaganda and by monetizing content, defendants provided material support that facilitated the attack | Allegations describe routine platform services without facts showing defendants knew their services would be used to facilitate this attack or that services were non‑routine | Court: Material‑support claims implausible — no facts that defendants knew their services would be used by Mateen or that their assistance was the proximate cause |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded proximate causation for federal and state claims | But‑for defendants’ hosting of ISIS content, Mateen would not have attacked; thus defendants’ conduct proximately caused plaintiffs’ injuries | Plaintiffs’ causal chain is too remote and speculative; proximate cause requires a direct relation to the injury | Court: Causation too attenuated; plaintiffs failed to allege a direct, foreseeable connection between defendants’ actions and the shooting |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 718 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (material‑support and causation analyses in ATA suits)
- Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal where provision of social‑media services to ISIS was not a plausible proximate cause of a domestic attack)
- Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing JASTA, Halberstam framework, and limits of material‑support/aiding‑and‑abetting liability)
- Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (framework for civil aiding‑and‑abetting: awareness of role and substantial assistance)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard for conspiracy and antitrust claims)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: threadbare conclusions insufficient)
- Weiss v. Nat'l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (material‑support theory and limits on vicarious responsibility)
- Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (proximate‑cause and material‑support discussion in ATA litigation)
- Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (proximate cause and forum for ‘by reason of’ causation analysis)