Crosby v. Radenko, 2011 Ohio 4662

Collision on I-70 near Englewood between Crosby's Honda Civic and a tractor-trailer owned/operated by Unlimited Freight, Inc.; Radenko pulled onto the berm for mechanical trouble and attempted to reenter, causing a line of stopped vehicles; Crosby could not stop in time and swerved, hitting the Unlimited Freight tractor-trailer while another tractor-trailer and a passenger vehicle were stopped behind the line.
Crosby sued for personal injuries and property loss, alleging negligence by Radenko and Unlimited Freight, Inc. and negligent training of Radenko by Unlimited Freight, Inc.; responsive pleadings and depositions followed.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, applying the intervening/superseding negligence doctrine from Didier v. Johns (1996); Crosby appeals.
The court analyzed negligence per se under the assured clear distance statute (R.C. 4511.21) and whether Crosby’s violation was the sole proximate cause or whether concurrent negligence could support liability.
The appellate court ultimately held that Didier’s reasoning was flawed, Crosby’s ACDA violation was not the sole proximate cause, and there were triable issues of fact regarding proximate cause and comparative negligence; the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Notes indicate the dissent would affirm summary judgment for Radenko, emphasizing Crosby’s sole proximate cause as her own negligence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Crosby's ACDA violation was the sole proximate cause	Crosby argues sudden emergency could negate per se liability and that proximate cause is for the jury.	Didier framework applies; Crosby’s conduct violated RC 4511.21 and is a complete bar to liability; proximate cause should be resolved as a matter of law.	No; proximate cause jury question; concurrent negligence may apply.
Whether summary judgment was appropriate given potential concurrent negligence	Reasonable minds could find Crosby's actions were not negligent due to emergency maneuvers.	Radenko's entry and actions created a chain of events; Crosby’s conduct per se negligent.	Not appropriate; there are genuine issues of material fact for a jury.
Whether the trial court properly applied the intervening/superseding-cause doctrine	Intervening acts by others could break the chain of causation.	Intervening/superseding doctrine should relieve liability if a non-negligent intervening act occurs.	Daubert/Didier flawed; the doctrine does not bar concurrent-negligence liability; issues for jury.

Didier v. Johns, 114 Ohio App.3d 746 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (intervening/superseding cause doctrine in multi-vehicle collisions; later criticized by majority)
Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 39 Ohio St.3d 35 (Ohio 1987) (negligence per se does not preclude comparative negligence; proximate cause for jury)
Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573 (Ohio 1993) (intervening cause requires break in causation by a capable, independent intervening actor)
Shinaver v. Szymanski, 14 Ohio St.3d 51 (Ohio 1984) (two following drivers; comparative negligence governs damages; intervening/superseding may not apply to bar liability)
Fleming (Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Fleming), 8 Ohio App.3d 164 (Ohio App. 1982) (concurrent negligence in chain-reaction; lead vehicle's liability may not be cut off by later negligent act)
Baum v. Augenstein, 10 Ohio App.3d 106 (Ohio App. 1983) (chain-of-events; concurrent tortfeasors; liability not automatically severed by later intervening act)
Didier (revisited), - (-) (majority discussion acknowledging Didier flaw and endorsing comparative-negligence framework)