Crocker v. Grammer
87 So. 3d 1190
Ala. Civ. App.2011Background
- Grammer injured in 2006 vehicle collision with Crocker; Grammer sues Crocker and insureds for injuries and an UM/UIM claim in 2008.
- Allstate elects to opt out of trial, binding issues of liability and damages to the fact-finder per Lowe v. Nationwide Ins. Co.
- Trial begins March 9, 2010; Crocker moves to suppress third-party medical payments during trial; court grants orally and issues a written order March 10, 2010 reviving collateral-source rule.
- Jury returns verdict for Grammer; Crocker awarded no damages, later judgment amount of $36,500 against Crocker.
- Crocker moves for new trial; trial court denies; Crocker appeals claiming § 12-21-45 remains valid despite Alabama Rules of Evidence.
- Issue on appeal is whether adoption of Alabama Rules of Evidence superseded § 12-21-45 and changed collateral-source treatment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 12-21-45 remains valid after adoption of the Alabama Rules of Evidence | Crocker argues Rules supersede § 12-21-45. | Grammer contends § 12-21-45 conflicts with Rules 401-402 and is abrogated. | § 12-21-45 remains valid; Rules did not supersede it. |
| Does § 12-21-45 conform to Rules 401 and 402 and not conflict with them | § 12-21-45 is inconsistent with admissibility standards. | § 12-21-45 per se admissible as its evidence bears on damages. | § 12-21-45 does not conflict with Rules 401/402; it governs admissibility of collateral-source evidence on damages. |
| Whether § 12-21-45 conflicts with Rule 403 | Evidence of third-party payments may be unfairly prejudicial. | Statute itself provides mechanisms to address prejudice; evidence remains admissible with safeguards. | No conflict with Rule 403; statute provides its own prejudice-mitigating mechanisms. |
| Whether Crocker should have been allowed to introduce third-party payments and argue their impact on damages | Crocker should be permitted to prove third-party payments affected Grammer's damages. | Trial court erred by excluding third-party payment evidence under collateral-source rules. | Crocker should have been allowed to introduce such evidence and argue damages reduction. |
| What relief is proper on appeal | Trial court erred; entire judgment should be reversed and remanded for new trial. | Remand appropriate to allow proper evidentiary handling of collateral-source issues. | Judgment reversed and remanded for new trial consistent with opinion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 895 So.2d 225 (Ala. 2004) (Rules adopted in 1996 supersede inconsistent provisions in Title 12)
- Williston v. Ard, 611 So.2d 274 (Ala. 1992) (collateral-source rule; damages not reduced by third-party benefits)
- American Legion Post No. 57 v. Leakey, 681 So.2d 1337 (Ala. 1996) (collateral-source rule; substantive nature with procedural components)
- Marsh v. Green, 782 So.2d 223 (Ala. 2000) (§ 12-21-45 allows jury to consider third-party payments; no dictation of outcome)
- Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So.2d 1320 (Ala. 1993) (notes on collateral-source handling in damages context)
- Bruno’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Massey, 914 So.2d 862 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (evidence of reimbursement costs; mechanism to mitigate prejudice)
- Melvin v. Loots, 23 So.3d 666 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (discusses collateral-source rule and § 12-21-45 interaction)