Crittindon v. LeBlanc
37 F.4th 177
5th Cir.2022Background
- Louisiana DPSC contracts with local parish jails (e.g., East Carroll/River Bend) to house state-sentenced prisoners when state beds are unavailable; responsibility for sending "pre-classification" paperwork to DPSC was unclear between parishes and DPSC had no backstop system.
- A 2012 DPSC Lean Six Sigma study documented systemic delays: average 110 days to calculate release dates after conviction and routine overdetentions (2,252 prisoners/year; ~72 days on average). DPSC corrected many internal delays but did not impose controls to ensure timely parish transmission of paperwork.
- Five plaintiffs (sentenced in Orleans, housed at River Bend) were returned to River Bend as DPSC-sentenced prisoners but their pre-classification packets were not timely sent to DPSC; each remained jailed beyond their release date (92–164 days).
- Plaintiffs sued several local and DPSC officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) failure-to-adopt-policies that would prevent overdetention and (2) direct participation in causing overdetention; the district court denied qualified immunity for the DPSC officials and the DPSC officials appealed interlocutorily.
- The Fifth Circuit majority (Higginbotham et al.) affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded: it held that reasonable jurors could find deliberate indifference and that the right to timely release was clearly established in some respects (denying qualified immunity for certain claims), while the dissent argued the claims were Heck-barred and that qualified immunity should have been granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure-to-adopt-policies (supervisory §1983 liability) | DPSC officials knew of systemic processing delays (Lean Six Sigma) and deliberately failed to require deadlines/oversight, causing overdetentions | DPSC addressed internal delays, lacked control over parish sheriffs, and state law already imposes transmission deadlines on sheriffs | Majority: jury could find deliberate indifference and objective unreasonableness; qualified immunity denied in part on these claims; case remanded |
| Direct participation (affirmative acts/inaction) | Stagg and Griffin were notified (family calls, spreadsheets) and failed promptly to act for Crittindon and Burse, causing continued unlawful detention | Defendants acted reasonably once aware; they did not know of some plaintiffs’ overdetention before discovery; for some plaintiffs the response was prompt | Majority: qualified immunity denied as to Crittindon and Burse (17-day inaction); granted as to Dominick, Copelin, Guidry where defendants lacked notice or acted promptly |
| Clearly established right / qualified immunity standard | Timely release is a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right; DPSC officials had fair warning that inaction violated rights | Defendants contend no controlling precedent made 17-day (or shorter) delays clearly unconstitutional; law lacks a bright-line shorter-than-30-day rule | Majority: right to timely release is clearly established and reasonable jurors could find defendants had fair warning; qualified immunity denied in part. Dissent: law not clearly established for these facts and immunity should apply |
| Heck/Preiser bar (suit challenges duration of confinement) | Plaintiffs: suing for damages for overdetention beyond sentence, not attacking validity/length of sentence | Defendants (dissent): Claims are effectively challenges to duration of confinement and thus Heck/Preiser bar applies; habeas was the proper remedy | Majority: declined to accept Heck bar argument (not raised by parties on appeal) and proceeded on qualified-immunity issues; dissent strongly argued Heck would bar §1983 claims and that issue should be dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011) (supervisory liability and deliberate indifference standard)
- Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980) (thirty-day overdetention constitutes due process deprivation)
- Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968) (duty to release not breached until expiration of a reasonable processing time)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (U.S. 1973) (habeas is exclusive remedy for challenges to fact/duration of confinement)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (§1983 barred when success would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction/sentence)
- Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (U.S. 1997) (distinguishing §1983 from habeas when challenge would affect duration of confinement)
- Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (U.S. 2002) (clearly established law and fair warning inquiry for qualified immunity)
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (U.S. 1987) (qualified immunity protects officials unless law clearly proscribed conduct)
- Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019) (standards for interlocutory review of denial of qualified immunity)
- Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2004) (collateral-order doctrine limits appellate review of qualified immunity denials)