Crittenden v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2017 IL App (1st) 160002WC

Carl Crittenden, a City of Chicago sanitation laborer for 27 years, injured his lower back at work on April 11, 2008 and became unable to perform his prior job duties.
Medical and FCE evidence established permanent light-duty restrictions (e.g., 20-lb lifting limit) and that he could not return to his regular job; vocational reports proposed alternate jobs paying roughly $8.25–$13.78/hr.
An arbitrator awarded a wage differential under 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1), using $11.00/hr as claimant’s post-injury earning capacity and calculating a weekly differential of $581.06.
The Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission reduced the differential by using $13.78/hr (the highest wage in the vocational report) to calculate a lower weekly award of $506.93, citing claimant’s lack of effort in job search.
The circuit court confirmed the Commission. On appeal the Appellate Court reversed: it held the Commission must identify a specific suitable occupation the claimant is able and qualified to perform and apply that occupation’s average wage when calculating the section 8(d)(1) wage differential; because the Commission used $13.78 without identifying a suitable occupation (the $13.78 wage corresponded to school bus driver, for which claimant lacked a license), the award was vacated and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper method to determine "average amount which [the claimant] is able to earn in some suitable employment" under 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(1) when claimant is not working	Crittenden: Court should construe statute (de novo) and require the Commission to identify a specific suitable occupation the claimant is able and qualified to perform and apply that occupation’s average wage.	City: Commission’s selection of post-injury earning is a factual determination entitled to deference and should be reviewed for manifest weight of the evidence.	The statute requires the Commission to identify, from the record, a specific suitable occupation (one the claimant is able and qualified to perform) and apply that occupation’s average wage; statutory interpretation reviewed de novo, application of that method is factual and reviewed for manifest weight; remand because Commission used $13.78 without identifying a qualifying occupation.

Cassens Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d 519 (explains de novo review for statutory interpretation and liberal construction of the Act)
Copperweld Tubing Prods. Co. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 402 Ill. App. 3d 630 (factual determinations by the Commission reviewed for manifest weight)
Gallianetti v. Industrial Comm’n, 315 Ill. App. 3d 721 (proof required for wage-differential awards; use of post-injury actual earnings or vocational/market evidence)
Deichmiller v. Industrial Comm’n, 147 Ill. App. 3d 66 (methods for establishing pre-injury earning capacity)
Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 485 (interpretive guidance on wage calculations under the Act)
Comfort Masters v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1043 (appellate courts may affirm Commission decisions if any legal basis in the record supports them)