Crittenden v. Ayers, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26397

Background

Crittenden was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death in California in 1989.
He filed a federal habeas petition in 1996; the district court denied relief and AEDPA governs review with deferential standards.
The Batson claim centers on the prosecutor striking the only African-American prospective juror, Ms. Casey, during jury selection.
California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on Batson grounds; the district court’s AEDPA analysis led to a remand for Cook v. LaMarque standard before ruling on step three.
The petition also raises ineffective assistance of counsel, coercing a guilt-phase mental-state defense and mitigation strategy in the penalty phase.
Crittenden challenges trial shackling and a juror’s Bible-related discussions during penalty deliberations.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Batson prima facie standard and step three after Cook	Casey’s race and prosecutor’s peremptory strike create inference of discrimination.	State had race-neutral justifications; any discrimination was not proven at step three.	Remand for step-three Batson analysis under Cook; prima facie shown but need proper step-three ruling.
Whether California Supreme Court's Batson decision was contrary to federal law	California high court used a 'strong likelihood' standard conflicting with Batson’s inference standard.	State court rulings should be given AEDPA deference unless unreasonable.	Ago—state court’s Batson ruling deemed contrary to clearly established federal law; remand for proper analysis.
Ineffective assistance of counsel—guilt phase	Counsel delayed neuropsychological testing and investigations; defense could have changed verdict.	Investigation was reasonable; expert opinions did not show prejudice; strategy supported trial results.	No federal habeas relief; no unreasonable application of Strickland; prejudice not shown.
Ineffective assistance—penalty phase mitigation strategy	Counsel failed to pursue brain dysfunction/mitigation; better strategy could have reduced penalty.	Investigation and mitigation strategy were reasonable; race-neutral decisions supported by record.	No relief; strategy deemed reasonable; no prejudice shown under Strickland.
Shackling during trial	Shackling was unnecessary and violated due process by relying on non-specific fears.	Deck permits discretion; danger and escape risk justified restraints; no clearly established error.	Not a violation of clearly established law; Deck controls; no best-practice procedural requirement established then.
Juror Bible consultation during penalty deliberations	Bible discussion could prejudice; extrinsic evidence concerns.	Fields controls; no substantial prejudice; brief mention inconsequential.	No prejudice; Fields controls; claimed misconduct not proven to affect outcome.

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (establishes three-step Batson framework)
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2005) (clarifies step-one burden for prima facie case)
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (U.S. 2005) (plural juror comparison for discrimination proof)
Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2010) (redefines Batson step-three standard)
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1985) (illegality of cause challenges for death-penalty objections)
Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2003) (AEDPA deference and review standards for state court rulings)
Paulino v. Harrison, 542 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2008) (standards for reconstructed prosecutor reasons at Batson step two)
Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (AEDPA deference and standard for Batson against state decision)
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2005) (restrained appearance and security considerations in trial)
Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2007) (juror Bible discussion and prejudice standards)
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (U.S. 1965) (juror prejudice and due process)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (standard for clearly established law under AEDPA)