Criswell, T. v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
115 A.3d 906
Pa. Super. Ct.2015Background
- Decedent Earl J. Criswell was a Merchant Marine who later developed lung cancer; Timothy Criswell, executor, sued under the Jones Act alleging asbestos exposure aboard defendants’ tankers caused the disease.
- Defendants Atlantic Richfield Company and Sunoco, Inc. moved for summary judgment after discovery, arguing plaintiff could not prove asbestos exposure on their vessels.
- At trial-court summary judgment, the court granted Atlantic’s and Sunoco’s motions, finding the depositional evidence too speculative to show asbestos exposure and applying a substantial-factor causation standard.
- Decedent’s testimony and documentary evidence showed he worked as an oiler and pump man on Atlantic ships and as a wiper and other roles on Sunoco ships, mixing and cutting insulation, using a bag labeled “asbestos” (Atlantic), and creating and inhaling dust from molded/pre-formed insulation (Sunoco).
- Plaintiff produced an expert report (Dr. Arthur Frank) opining Decedent had asbestos-related pleural disease and that cumulative asbestos exposure contributed to lung carcinoma in combination with smoking.
- The Superior Court reviewed summary judgment de novo, concluded the trial court ignored competent exposure evidence and applied the wrong causation standard under the Jones Act, and reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff produced evidence of asbestos exposure on Atlantic and Sunoco vessels | Decedent’s testimony and documents establish direct exposure: handling loose material labeled “asbestos,” cutting/mixing insulation, inhaling dust from removed/installed insulation | Evidence is speculative or hearsay; Decedent lacked expertise to identify asbestos visually and relied on heat-resistance inference | Reversed: record contained competent evidence (testimony, labeled material, GE specs) creating genuine factual dispute on exposure |
| Proper causation standard under the Jones Act | Jones Act requires only that employer negligence play any part, however slight, in causing injury; plaintiff’s expert links asbestos exposure to disease | Trial court applied a substantial-factor / proximate-cause standard (citing products-liability precedent) and found plaintiff’s proof insufficient | Reversed: court must apply the relaxed Jones Act standard (any part, however slight); plaintiff’s expert and exposure evidence meet that standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795 (Pa. Super. 2012) (summary-judgment standard and appellate review described)
- Samarin v. GAF Corp., 571 A.2d 398 (Pa. Super. 1989) (material’s heat resistance alone insufficient to infer asbestos content)
- Bushless v. GAF Corp., 585 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. 1990) (related holding on admissibility/insufficiency of similar proof)
- Richards v. Dravo Corp., 375 A.2d 750 (Pa. Super. 1977) (Jones Act concurrent jurisdiction and relaxed causation under maritime negligence)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (U.S. 2011) (FELA/Jones Act standard: employer negligence need only play any part, even the slightest, in causing injury)