Cristian Guzman v. Attorney General United States, 770 F.3d 1077

Guzman, a Dominican Republic citizen, is a lawful permanent resident who admitted to the U.S. in 1994 and faced removal proceedings beginning with his 2005 drug conviction, although his 1995 offense also made him deportable.
IIRIRA's stop-time rule, effective 1997, ends continuous residence when an offense renders the alien removable, thereby potentially disqualifying him from cancellation of removal.
The Immigration Judge denied relief, determining the stop-time rule applied to Guzman’s pre-IIRIRA 1995 offense and that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed, rejecting Guzman’s argument that applying the stop-time rule retroactively created a new disability.
Guzman argued that pre-IIRIRA opportunities for relief, such as a 212(c) waiver, would have allowed him to accrue seven years and sought to delay proceedings, making retroactivity impermissible.
The government contended that Guzman’s removal proceedings are based on the 2005 offense, and the stop-time rule’s application cannot create a new disability for pre-IIRIRA conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the stop-time rule retroactive as applied to Guzman’s pre-IIRIRA conduct?	Guzman asserts a new disability results from applying the rule to pre-1997 conduct.	The rule simply governs continuous presence and does not create a new disability.	No impermissible retroactivity; rule not a new disability.
May Guzman pursue concurrent 212(c) relief and cancellation of removal?	Should be allowed to pursue both forms of relief concurrently.	Statute precludes concurrent requests; conviction remains a bar.	Question deemed moot; no reversal needed.
Did the BIA err in denying termination to pursue naturalization under 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f)?	Acosta Hidalgo misinterprets the regulation; DHS need not provide prima facie communication.	BIA acted consistently with Acosta Hidalgo and procedures; petitioner failed to pursue prima facie determination.	Regulatory interpretation affirmed; termination denied.
Is the BIA’s application of the stop-time rule arbitrary and capricious under Judulang?	Judulang requires rational, purpose-driven interpretation of the statute; stopping relief undermines immigration purposes.	Stop-time rule is Congress's policy choice; not arbitrary in application.	Not arbitrary or capricious; deference upheld.

Landgraf v. USI Film Prod. Co., 511 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1994) (two-step test for retroactivity; vested rights and new disabilities)
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (U.S. 2001) (retroactivity of 212(c) waiver elimination; plea agreements and vested relief)
Heaven v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2006) (retroactivity of stop-time rule to prevent cancellation of removal)
Martinez v. I.N.S., 523 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 2008) (stop-time rule applied to pre-IIRIRA deportable offense for later relief)
Sinotes-Cruz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (stop-time rule impermissibly retroactive when offense did not render deportable at plea)
Briseno-Flores v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 492 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2007) (ambiguous retroactivity under stop-time; context-specific analysis)
Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012) (new travel admission rule as a new disability; travel ban as retroactive)
Rodriguez-Munoz v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 2005) (concurrent relief implications; waivers and cancellation effects)
In re Acosta Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 2007) (regulation interpretation on termination for naturalization; prima facie requirement)