Crispino v. State, 417 Md. 31

Crispino was convicted after a second jury trial of two counts of child sexual abuse, two counts of second degree sexual offense, and one count of third degree sexual offense related to two sisters when they were around ages five to seven.
The alleged offenses against Camberly J. occurred between Jan 6, 2000 and Jan 5, 2001; those against Shannon J. occurred between July 7, 1999 and July 6, 2000.
At trial, the State presented specific incidents including two acts of French kissing and two acts of cunnilingus testified to by Shannon J.; Camberly J. testified to an act in a bathroom.
Crispino moved for acquittal, arguing the State failed to prove the time frame; the court denied, finding the State did not need to prove the exact dates.
Crispino testified he babysat the girls only from 2003 to 2005; his father corroborated late timing, indicating uncertainty about earlier babysitting.
The trial judge refused Crispino’s requests for jury instructions requiring unanimity on the specific acts and for explicit timing in the verdict sheet; Crispino was convicted on all counts and sentenced to concurrent terms.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Unanimity on the specific act required	Crispino argued jurors must unanimously agree on the exact act that constituted abuse	State contended unanimity on the act was unnecessary; abuse suffices as the element	Unanimity on the specific act not required; verdict valid as gravamen is abuse evidence
Time frame of acts as alleged in the information	Crispino claimed no custody/time-frame connection; variance between information and proof	State argued variance allowed; sufficiency, not timing instruction, controls	No reversible error; variance permissible and timing need not be exact in this context

Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999) (Md. 1999) (broad scope of sexual abuse includes acts not enumerated)
Tribbit v. State, 403 Md. 638, 943 A.2d 1260 (2008) (Md. 2008) (statutory sexual abuse may cover broader conduct beyond enumerated acts)
Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 144 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1999) (U.S. 1999) (unanimity in multi-offense series; limit on unanimity as to means)
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1991) (U.S. 1991) (general rule: jurors need not agree on mode of commission when one crime can be committed several ways)
Rice v. State, 311 Md. 116, 532 A.2d 135 (1987) (Md. 1987) (unanimity not required on modes of committing a single offense where elements identical)
Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 752 A.2d 606 (2000) (Md. 2000) (gravamen of §35C is abuse; multiple acts can support a single offense)
Mulkey v. State, 316 Md. 475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989) (Md. 1989) (indictment timing in child abuse cases need not be overly specific; memories of young victims)
Hebron v. State, 331 Md. 219, 627 A.2d 1029 (1993) (Md. 1993) (judge, not jury, determines sufficiency of evidence)
Carter v. State, 35 Md. App. 224, 370 A.2d 183 (1977) (Md. App. 1977) (variance between indictment dates and proof permissible)
Harmony v. State, 88 Md. App. 306, 594 A.2d 1182 (1991) (Md. App. 1991) (child abuse proof may cover broad time frames)