Crim v. Dietrich
67 N.E.3d 433
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- In 2015 Collin Crim (born 2005) sued his obstetrician, Dr. Gina Dietrich, alleging she failed to obtain informed consent from his mother, Teri, by not advising that fetal macrosomia and C-section were options/risks before inducing labor in June 2005.
- Collin was delivered vaginally after induction, suffered shoulder dystocia, sustained a fractured right clavicle and brachial plexus injury, and later underwent nerve graft surgery and ongoing therapy.
- At trial the Crims presented testimony that Dietrich measured fundal heights suggestive of a large fetus, ordered an April 2005 ultrasound (which lacked an estimated fetal weight), estimated an 8–9 lb birth weight one week before delivery, and induced labor; Teri testified she would have chosen a C-section if informed of the risks and alternatives.
- Plaintiffs’ expert (Dr. Benson) testified Dietrich breached the standard of care by failing to estimate fetal weight near delivery, relying on an incomplete ultrasound, failing to discuss macrosomia/risks, and that a C-section would more likely than not have avoided Collin’s injury.
- At the close of plaintiffs’ case the trial court granted a directed verdict for Dietrich on the informed-consent claim, relying on precedent (St. Gemme) that, according to the court, required expert proof that a reasonable patient would have chosen the alternative; the jury later returned a verdict for Dietrich on the remaining claim.
- The appellate court reversed, holding the directed verdict was improper and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether expert testimony was required to prove what a reasonable patient would have decided (proximate causation in informed-consent claim) | Expert proof not required; jurors can decide whether undisclosed information would have altered a reasonable person’s decision based on common sense and plaintiff’s testimony | St. Gemme requires expert evidence on proximate causation except in gross negligence cases; thus plaintiffs needed expert testimony that a reasonable patient would choose C-section | Reversed: no per se requirement that a medical expert must testify about what a reasonable patient would have done; jury may evaluate causation in informed-consent cases where evidence shows viable alternative and plaintiff’s testimony creates a factual dispute |
Key Cases Cited
- St. Gemme v. Tomlin, 118 Ill. App. 3d 766 (1983) (addressed expert evidence on proximate causation where experts agreed no reasonable alternative to treatment existed)
- Coryell v. Smith, 274 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1995) (held expert testimony is not categorically required on what a reasonable patient would have done in informed-consent cases; jurors can apply common sense)
- Davis v. Kraff, 405 Ill. App. 3d 20 (2010) (sets out four elements of informed consent)
- Schiff v. Friberg, 331 Ill. App. 3d 643 (2002) (directed verdict improper where testimony raises credibility disputes and factual issues for jury)
- Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972) (endorses objective prudent-person test for causation in informed-consent claims)