Cridge v. Hobbs
2014 Ark. 153
| Ark. | 2014Background
- Cridge pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine in Garland County; 240-month sentence; offense date August 8, 2009.
- On April 18, 2013, Cridge filed a pro se petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus against the ADC Director seeking recalculation of parole-eligibility date in Jefferson County.
- Circuit court dismissed the petition; Cridge appealed and moved to file a belated brief.
- The court treats declaratory judgments as postconviction relief when challenging conditions of confinement; an appeal from a denied postconviction petition is not allowed if the appellant cannot prevail.
- The court held the relieft sought was unavailable because Cridge failed to state a basis for declaratory judgment under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-111-101 to -111, and parole-eligibility is determined by the ADC, not the trial court.
- The court concluded the 70% parole-eligibility rule under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-611 (as applied to the meth offense) does not violate due process or equal protection, and that the ADC correctly applied the statute to determine parole-eligibility date; the appeal was dismissed as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether declaratory judgment/mandamus can challenge parole calculation. | Cridge seeks to compel re-calculation by ADC. | No basis for declaratory relief; statute/applications misapplied. | Appeal dismissed; relief unavailable. |
| Constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-611 (due process/equal protection). | §16-93-611 unconstitutional as due process/equal protection violation. | Statute constitutional; no protected liberty interest in parole. | Statute constitutional; no due-process or equal-protection violation. |
| Whether parole eligibility is ADC's discretion rather than a trial-court modification of sentence. | Trial court should determine parole eligibility or consider modification. | Parole eligibility is determined by the ADC. | Parole eligibility lies with ADC; statute applied accordingly. |
| Whether appellant has a liberty interest in meritorious good time and related credits. | Meritorious good time creates liberty interest. | No liberty interest in good time; statute reconciled with other credits. | No liberty interest in good time; statute reconciled with other provisions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gardner v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 439 (2013 Ark.) (declaratory judgments in postconviction context; parole-related relief discussed)
- Holliday v. State, 2013 Ark. 47 (2013 Ark.) (per curiam; dismissal of meritless postconviction claims)
- Bates v. State, 2012 Ark. 394 (2012 Ark.) (per curiam; appeal not allowed where no colorable relief)
- Martin v. State, 2012 Ark. 312 (2012 Ark.) (per curiam; merits not reached where relief unavailable)
- Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. 212 (2012 Ark.) (parole-eligibility determinations are the ADC's domain)
- Pitts v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 457 (2013 Ark.) (rejects argument that parole-eligibility statute cannot apply absent reference in judgment)
- Stephens v. Hobbs, 2012 Ark. 332 (2012 Ark.) (parole-eligibility statute applicability)
- Thompson v. State, 2009 Ark. 235 (2009 Ark.) (parole eligibility within executive branch authority)
- Abdullah v. Lockhart, 302 Ark. 506 (1990 Ark.) (parole-eligibility and related credits; longstanding principles)
- Fain v. State, 286 Ark. 35 (1985 Ark.) (treatment of good time and parole considerations)
- Crawford v. Cashion, 2010 Ark. 124 (2010 Ark.) (per curiam; writ relief contexts)
- Gardner v. Hobbs, 2013 Ark. 439 (2013 Ark.) (reconciliation of §16-93-611 with good-time/transfer provisions)
- Lester v. Lester, 2011 Ark. 329 (2011 Ark.) (parole-eligibility determinations; per curiam)