Crews v. Paine, 686 F. App'x 540

Background

Stanley Crews, a Black patrol officer, was terminated by the Denver School District after an incident where he left a burglary scene and did not timely file a report; Sergeant Clifford Paine recommended termination and Chief Michael Eaton effectuated it.
Crews alleged race discrimination under § 1983 (and § 1981) against the District and against Paine and Eaton in their individual capacities; the officers invoked qualified immunity at summary judgment.
The district court denied summary judgment, finding Crews had a prima facie case and raised genuine disputes of pretext (including inconsistent discipline practices and customs regarding incident reporting).
The district court applied the cat’s paw theory to attribute Paine’s alleged animus to Chief Eaton and concluded Eaton’s limited investigation might permit an inference of bias influencing the decision.
On interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit must accept the district court’s factual findings for qualified-immunity review but may decide pure legal questions de novo.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Sergeant Paine is entitled to qualified immunity for recommending termination based on alleged racial animus	Crews: Paine’s recommendation was motivated by race and produced a triable showing of pretext (inconsistent discipline, district practice)	Paine: No clearly established law put him on notice his recommendation could violate Constitution; factual disputes undermining discrimination claim	Denied immunity as to Paine — court accepts district court’s factual findings that support prima facie case and pretext; clearly established law covers supervisory actors who set in motion discriminatory terminations
Whether Chief Eaton is entitled to qualified immunity for effectuating the termination	Crews: Eaton’s limited investigation supports inference Eaton harbored or adopted discriminatory intent (Smothers-style inference)	Eaton: No evidence he personally harbored animus; cat’s paw is an employer theory and does not clearly establish personal § 1983 liability	Remanded — court finds no clear authority making a neutral decisionmaker personally liable under a cat’s paw theory and declines to address in first instance whether Eaton’s conduct independently shows discriminatory intent
Whether the cat’s paw doctrine can create individual liability under § 1983	Crews: Paine’s biased recommendation influenced Eaton; employer liability doctrine supports attributing misconduct	Defendants: Cat’s paw is an employer-liability concept and cannot impose personal § 1983 liability on an unbiased decisionmaker	Court: No binding precedent clearly establishing personal § 1983 liability via cat’s paw; Eaton entitled to qualified immunity on that theory absent further district-court findings
Whether McDonnell Douglas framework and similarly-situated evidence apply to § 1983 supervisory claims	Crews: McDonnell Douglas applies; presented similarly-situated and practice-based evidence	Paine: Framework not clearly established for supervisors and § 1983; only similarly-situated evidence counts	Court: McDonnell Douglas applies to § 1983 supervisory claims; Crews met prima facie showing and raised pretext issues accepted for purposes of appeal

Key Cases Cited

Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir.) (appellate standard for interlocutory qualified-immunity appeals)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Sup. Ct.) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Thomas v. Berry Plastics Corp., 803 F.3d 510 (10th Cir.) (discussion of cat’s paw theory)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (Sup. Ct.) (personal liability under § 1983 requires individual misconduct)
Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir.) (supervisor liability for setting in motion adverse employment actions)
Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir.) (scope of facts appellate court must accept on interlocutory qualified-immunity review)
Kendrick v. Penske Transportation Services, Inc., 220 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.) (employer acted contrary to practice can show pretext)
Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 761 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir.) (qualified immunity where theory of liability not clearly established)
Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., 740 F.3d 530 (10th Cir.) (limited investigative process can support inference of discriminatory motive)
Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir.) (application of McDonnell Douglas to § 1983 supervisory claims)
Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir.) (McDonnell Douglas framework in § 1983 context)