862 S.E.2d 706
S.C.2021Background
- Petitioner (a University of South Carolina professor) sought an expedited original-jurisdiction declaration that Proviso 117.190 does not bar the University's universal indoor mask mandate.
- On July 30, 2021 the University adopted a universal facemask requirement inside campus buildings (with limited exceptions). On August 2 the Attorney General opined the proviso prohibited the mandate; the University then announced it would not enforce the mandate except in certain settings but encouraged mask use.
- Proviso 117.190 provides that a public institution of higher learning may not use appropriated funds to require that students have received the COVID-19 vaccination in order to be present at institution facilities without being required to wear a facemask (i.e., it bars requiring masks only for the unvaccinated).
- The Attorney General argued the proviso was ambiguous and, when read with legislative intent and other provisos, was intended to prohibit mask mandates generally; he also raised justiciability/political-question concerns.
- The Court accepted original jurisdiction, treated the dispute as a justiciable statutory-interpretation question, applied the plain-meaning rule, and declared Proviso 117.190 does not prohibit a universal mask mandate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justiciability | Creswick: Court may decide statutory interpretation; controversy is ripe because AG's opinion caused University to withdraw mandate. | Wilson: Matter presents a political question / not a justiciable controversy. | Court: Justiciable. AG opinion changed University policy; issue is statutory interpretation, not a political question. |
| Scope of Proviso 117.190 — universal mask mandates | Creswick: Proviso does not prohibit a universal mask mandate that applies equally to vaccinated and unvaccinated. | Wilson: Proviso ambiguous; intended to prohibit mask mandates generally; should be construed to bar the University’s universal mandate. | Court: Proviso unambiguous as written; it prohibits requiring only unvaccinated persons to wear masks and does not bar universal mask mandates. |
| Use of post-enactment legislative statements to determine intent | Creswick: Court should rely on text; not consider post-passage statements. | Wilson: Post-enactment statements by legislators evidence intent to ban all mandates. | Court: May not consider post-passage statements by individual legislators; legislative intent is determined from the statute’s text. |
| Comparison to other provisos (e.g., Proviso 1.108) | Creswick: Textual differences show the Legislature knew how to ban all mask mandates when intended. | Wilson: Collective reading of provisos supports a broader prohibition. | Court: Comparison confirms Legislature used different language when intending a categorical ban; 117.190 targets discrimination against unvaccinated, not universal bans. |
Key Cases Cited
- Key v. Currie, 305 S.C. 115, 406 S.E.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (original-jurisdiction standard where public interest or emergency exists)
- Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 549 S.E.2d 243 (2001) (plain-meaning rule governs when statutory language is clear)
- Miller v. Aiken, 364 S.C. 303, 613 S.E.2d 364 (2005) (court must apply statute according to literal meaning if unambiguous)
- Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 559 S.E.2d 843 (2002) (courts may look beyond literal meaning when it contradicts legislative purpose)
- Smith v. Tiffany, 419 S.C. 548, 799 S.E.2d 479 (2017) (search for legislative intent beyond text is allowed only when language gives rise to doubt)
- Bowaters Carolina Corp. v. Smith, 257 S.C. 563, 186 S.E.2d 761 (1972) (post-enactment statements by individual legislators are not admissible to prove legislative intent)