Crespin v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 429 P.3d 968

In 2009, 14-year-old Jessica Crespin was picked up from school by Fabian Fierro (18) driving an uninsured car owned by his mother, with Travis Bainbridge (19) as a passenger.
The three went to Fierro’s mother’s house; after ~20 minutes inside, Fierro and then Bainbridge had sexual relations with Crespin. No physical force was used in the car or prior to the acts; the assaults occurred after they left the vehicle.
Crespin reported the incidents; Fierro and Bainbridge pled guilty to related criminal charges. Crespin was an insured under her mother’s Safeco auto policy, which included uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for injuries “caused by an accident” arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.
Crespin made a UM claim; Safeco denied coverage. Crespin sued Safeco (and the men). After Crespin presented her case at a bench trial, Safeco moved for involuntary dismissal under Rule 1-041(B), which the district court granted.
The district court found no sufficient causal nexus between use of the vehicle and the sexual assault—vehicle use was limited to transportation and the assaults occurred after exiting the car—so UM coverage did not apply. The court awarded Crescent $10,000 against Bainbridge for the intentional tort but denied UM coverage. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Crespin’s injuries “arose out of” the use of the uninsured vehicle under UM coverage	Crespin: vehicle was integral to the plan; without the car the men would not have picked her up—thus the vehicle was an active accessory and there is a sufficient causal nexus	Safeco: vehicle was used only for transportation to the house; assaults occurred after exiting the car, so the vehicle was not an active accessory and transportation alone is insufficient	Held: No. Transporting victim to location is not a sufficient causal nexus; vehicle was not an active accessory, so no UM coverage
Whether any independent intervening act broke causation	Crespin: the plan to assault was continuous from pickup; no independent act severed causation	Safeco: the events at the house (acts after exiting the vehicle) broke any causal link	Court did not need to decide this issue for resolution and declined to address it in depth

Britt v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co., 120 N.M. 813, 907 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995) (adopts three-part test: sufficient causal nexus/active accessory, act of independent significance, and normal use of vehicle)
Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1987) (source of the three-part causation test applied in Britt)
Barncastle v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Cos., 129 N.M. 672, 11 P.3d 1234 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (vehicle used to position shooter and escape was an active accessory)
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blystra, 86 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 1996) (drive-by shooting: vehicle is an active accessory by enabling approach and escape)
Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Julie R., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (mere transportation to scene is insufficient; vehicle must be a substantial factor such as confinement or direct use in the assault)
Estate of Tollardo v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1301 (D.N.M. 2005) (vehicle merely used for transport does not satisfy active accessory element)