Crayton v. State, 543 S.W.3d 544

Reginald Crayton was convicted by a Sebastian County jury of first-degree domestic battering under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-303(a)(5) and (b)(1) and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.
The charged offense required proof that Crayton committed second- or third-degree battering and had two prior domestic-battering convictions within ten years of the current offense.
The State introduced evidence of Crayton's prior domestic-battering convictions during the guilt phase.
Crayton argued on appeal that those prior convictions were not elements of the offense and thus should not have been admitted at the guilt phase.
The circuit court instructed the jury using the Arkansas Model Jury Instruction AMI Crim. 2d 2610, which tracks § 5-26-303(a)(5), and the court of appeals affirmed the conviction.
A separate subsequent-offense enhancement under § 5-26-303(b)(2)(B) was charged but not submitted to the jury at sentencing because the 2012 judgment lacked an offense date.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prior domestic-battery convictions must be proved at guilt phase or are only a sentencing enhancement	State: prior convictions are elements under § 5-26-303(a)(5) and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt at guilt phase	Crayton: prior convictions are not elements of first-degree domestic battering but a sentencing enhancement, so evidence should be excluded from guilt phase	Court: Subsection (a) lists elements; (a)(5) requires proof of two prior convictions within 10 years, so they are elements and admissible in guilt phase; affirmed
Whether AMI Crim. 2d 2610 correctly states the law for first-degree domestic battering	State: AMI mirrors the statute and is presumptively correct	Crayton: model instruction is incorrect for treating priors as elements	Court: Model instruction reflects § 5-26-303(a)(5); presumption stands and Crayton did not rebut it; instruction was proper

Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (interpreting statutory language is reviewed de novo)
Keep Our Dollars in Independence Cty. v. Mitchell, 2017 Ark. 154, 518 S.W.3d 64 (primary rule: give effect to legislative intent; construe statutes by plain meaning)
Carmody v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 373 Ark. 79, 281 S.W.3d 721 (statute should be construed so no word is superfluous)
State v. Sola, 354 Ark. 76, 118 S.W.3d 95 (presumption that model jury instructions state the correct law)
Fronterhouse v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 211, 463 S.W.3d 312 (model instructions should be altered only if inaccurate or incomplete)