Crawford v. Custom Sign Co., 138 So. 3d 894

In 1997 Custom Sign Co. fabricated and installed a “Welcome to Clarksdale” sign hung from a railroad viaduct; the sign reused panels from a prior sign and Custom made a new backside/tubing.
In 2001 a tractor-trailer driven by Alex Jordan (employed by Morris Transportation) stopped under the viaduct to inspect the sign, and Michael Crawford subsequently collided with the stopped truck and sued Custom, Jordan, and Morris.
Procedural history included removal to federal court, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, re-filing under Mississippi’s savings statute, settlement with Jordan and Morris, and Custom’s motion for summary judgment asserting the six-year statute of repose (Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-41).
At summary judgment Custom argued the statute of repose barred Crawford’s claims because the sign was placed in 1997 and the six-year period expired by 2003; Crawford argued factual disputes (ownership of the viaduct, whether Custom performed design/construction) and alleged fraudulent concealment/waiver.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Custom; the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding genuine issues of material fact about (1) ownership of the viaduct/who is the “owner” for repose purposes, and (2) whether Custom’s work constituted design/planning/supervision or mere rework of an existing sign.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability of statute of repose (§ 15‑1‑41) to the sign-related claims	Crawford: repose should not bar claims because factual issues (ownership, occupancy, acceptance) remain and repose requires owner’s written acceptance/occupancy	Custom: repose applies because the sign was installed and in use in June 1997, so six‑year repose expired before suit	Reversed and remanded — genuine issues of material fact preclude resolving repose on summary judgment; ownership/acceptance issues unresolved
Ownership of the viaduct (who is the “owner” whose acceptance/occupancy triggers repose)	Crawford: ownership is disputed (state vs. City/committee); no permit or ownership proof was submitted	Custom: ownership not pertinent because sign was in use; owner’s identity irrelevant to repose start date	Reversed — ownership is a genuine factual issue that must be resolved before applying repose
Nature of Custom’s activity (design/planning/supervision/construction vs. mere rework)	Crawford: testimony shows uncertainty whether sign was newly constructed or merely reworked; thus factual question whether Custom performed activities covered by repose	Custom: performed installation and work that places it within § 15‑1‑41 coverage (construction/design) and repose therefore applies	Reversed — record permits reasonable minds to differ; jury determination needed on whether Custom’s activity fits statute’s covered work

Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051 (Miss. 1986) (summary judgment improper where genuine factual issues exist regarding applicability of statute defenses)
Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1983) (nonmovant must present significant probative evidence to create factual issues at summary judgment)
Stuart v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 21 So.3d 544 (Miss. 2009) (de novo review of summary judgment)
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Martin, 998 So.2d 956 (Miss. 2008) (standards for affirming summary judgment)
Evan Johnson & Sons Constr., Inc. v. State, 877 So.2d 360 (Miss. 2004) (trial court must not decide factual disputes on summary judgment)
Gulfport Fertilizer Co. v. McMurphy, 75 So. 113 (Miss. 1917) (historical authority on trial court’s role when reasonable minds may differ)
Union Planters Nat’l Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1982) (summary judgment evidentiary standards for nonmovant)