Crawford v. Cty. Cncl. of Prince George's Cty.
290 A.3d 571
Md.2023Background:
- The dispute concerns a 28.9-acre Collington Center property in Prince George’s County with a ~290,225 sq ft building; the E-I-A zone permits "warehouses and distribution facilities."
- Amazon bought the property and sought an SDP amendment to convert it to a last‑mile delivery station (packages typically held <12 hours, sorted, and dispatched to drivers), which required paved-area increases exceeding 10%.
- Prince George’s County Planning Board staff recommended approval; the Planning Board unanimously approved the SDP amendment, finding the use qualified as a "warehouse and distribution facility."
- Petitioners appealed to the District Council, which affirmed the Planning Board’s decision; petitioners then sought judicial review in the Circuit Court, which affirmed.
- The Supreme Court of Maryland granted certiorari and affirmed the circuit court, holding there was substantial evidence that Amazon’s proposed use satisfied the Zoning Ordinance definitions of "warehouse unit" and/or "distribution facility."
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Amazon’s last‑mile facility qualify as a "warehouse unit" under PGCC §27‑107.01(a)(256)? | Crawford: Not a "warehouse"—packages are held only briefly (<12 hrs); operation is a parcel hub, not traditional warehousing. | Amazon/District Council: Ordinance doesn't require minimum hold time; facility stores/sorts packages and supports distribution operations. | Held: Mixed question of law and fact; substantial evidence supports that the facility performs "storage" and distribution functions and qualifies as a warehouse unit. |
| What standard governs review of the District Council’s affirmance—de novo or substantial‑evidence? | Crawford: Whether the use is permitted is a pure question of law—de novo review. | District Council/Amazon: It's a mixed question of law and fact; apply substantial‑evidence review per Zimmer. | Held: Question is mixed; apply substantial‑evidence standard and defer if agency conclusion is "fairly debatable." |
| Do later legislative amendments (e.g., CB‑18‑2019, CB‑013‑2018) indicate the pre‑existing definitions excluded last‑mile uses? | Crawford: Subsequent targeted definitions (e.g., Merchandise Logistics Center) show legislature intended to exclude this use from prior definitions. | District Council/Amazon: Later amendments clarify or create new categories but do not show that earlier definitions excluded last‑mile operations. | Held: Court declined to ascribe dispositive weight to later amendments; they do not demonstrate prior exclusion. |
| Does the Zoning Ordinance’s "distribution facility" definition exclude direct‑to‑consumer shipping under Part (A)? | Crawford: Part (A) covers shipping to sales outlets/service operations, not direct consumer delivery. | Amazon: Amazon is a retailer and ships merchandise to/from the facility; facility also supports Amazon’s delivery service—fits Part (A) (and Part (B) analogously). | Held: Court construed Part (A) to encompass Amazon’s operations; substantial evidence supports that the facility serves Amazon’s distribution/service operations. |
Key Cases Cited:
- County Council of Prince George’s County v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490 (2015) (establishes when District Council may reverse Planning Board and frames applicable review standards)
- FC‑GEN Operations Inv.’s LLC v. Comptroller of Maryland, 482 Md. 343 (2022) (distinguishes categories of review and discusses agency deference for certain legal questions)
- Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 158 (2001) (illustrates deference to agency interpretations supported by substantial evidence)
- Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257 (2010) (recites rules of statutory interpretation applied to ordinances)
- Lucas v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore City, 147 Md. App. 209 (2002) (example of appellate deference where agency interpretation was supported by record evidence)