Crawford, Milton Ray
PD-1283-15
| Tex. App. | Sep 30, 2015Background
- Milton Ray Crawford was convicted of failing to verify sex-offender registration (charged under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.102(b)(2)) and pleaded true to two prior failure-to-register convictions; jury assessed 85 years’ imprisonment.
- The indictment charged a third-degree felony for the 2012 nonverification; the State alleged two prior failures-to-register as enhancements.
- Crawford argued the statutory enhancement applied exclusively under art. 62.102(c), which increases punishment to the next-higher felony degree for prior convictions under the same article (i.e., to a second-degree felony), and thus § 12.42(d) (habitual-offender enhancement) could not be used.
- The trial court and the Tenth Court of Appeals rejected Crawford’s exclusive‑enhancement claim, upheld the use of Penal Code enhancement provisions, and affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Crawford also argued (unsuccessfully) that his 1984 sexual-assault conviction was improperly given “quadruple duty,” and he sought mistrial over two allegedly improper prosecutorial punishment‑phase arguments; the court found any error cured by instructions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crawford) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether art. 62.102(c) is the exclusive enhancement provision for repeat failures to register | art. 62.102(c) is a specific statutory enhancement that precludes application of the general habitual‑offender statute (§ 12.42), so punishment should be increased only to the next higher felony degree | art. 62.102(c) is a specific enhancement but does not preclude application of the general enhancement scheme (§ 12.42); both can apply where their elements are met | Court of Appeals: rejected exclusivity; § 12.42 enhancement was properly applied and sentence is legal |
| Whether Crawford’s 85‑year sentence was unlawfully enhanced beyond art. 62.102(c)’s range | Sentence exceeds the lawful range if only art. 62.102(c) applies (would be second‑degree range) | Habitual‑offender enhancement under § 12.42(b)/(d) properly increased punishment range to first‑degree/habitual range | Held: enhancement under § 12.42 was properly applied; sentence not illegal |
| Whether the 1984 sexual‑assault conviction was improperly used multiple times ("quadruple duty") | Using the 1984 conviction to establish duty to register and also as the basis for prior failures-to-register (and thus for enhancement) is improper duplication | The 1984 conviction was not used as one of the two priors for habitual enhancement in this case, so no improper duplication occurred | Held: no abuse; claim rejected |
| Whether prosecutorial punishment‑phase arguments warranted mistrial | Prosecutor’s parole and child‑danger arguments were improper and prejudicial, justifying mistrial | Any improper argument was promptly objected to and cured by the trial court’s instruction; no incurable prejudice shown | Held: trial court did not abuse discretion; curative instructions sufficed |
Key Cases Cited
- Ford v. State, 334 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (recognizes art. 62.102(c) as a punishment‑enhancement provision that increases punishment to the next highest felony degree)
- Reyes v. State, 96 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (art. 62.102(c) is a specific exception but does not preclude application of § 12.42)
- Barker v. State, 335 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (rejects exclusivity of art. 62.102(c) and permits habitual enhancement)
- Sanders v. State, 785 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990) (prior‑conviction defect can render enhancement improper despite plea of true)
- Mikel v. State, 167 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) (exception to forfeiture where enhancement allegations are legally insufficient despite plea)
- Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (approves no‑forfeiture rule where enhancement is improperly alleged)