998 F.3d 686
5th Cir.2021Background
- Plaintiff Lucas Cranor provided his cell number to 5 Star Nutrition after an in-store purchase and received unsolicited marketing text messages.
- Cranor replied “STOP” to some messages; after a dispute he and 5 Star executed a pre-suit settlement (Nov. 29, 2018) in which Cranor waived claims for $1,000. 5 Star later sent another promotional text; Cranor again replied “STOP.”
- Cranor filed a class action under the TCPA alleging 5 Star used an ATDS to send unsolicited texts without consent, causing nuisance, invasion of privacy, battery depletion, and use of allotted minutes.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing, holding a single unsolicited text was not a sufficient injury in fact.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding Cranor adequately alleged a concrete, particularized injury (nuisance/invasion of privacy) cognizable under Article III and consistent with the TCPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether receipt of a single unsolicited marketing text can supply an Article III injury in fact under the TCPA | A single unwanted robotext causes a concrete, particularized injury (nuisance/invasion of privacy; battery/minutes depletion) Congress intended to remedy | A lone text is a fleeting, de minimis intrusion qualitatively different from the home-call problem Congress targeted | Held: Yes. A single unsolicited text can be a concrete injury in fact under Spokeo/TCPA when it alleges nuisance/invasion of privacy and particularized harm |
| Whether Congress's findings in the TCPA support recognizing texts/cellular intrusions as cognizable injuries | TCPA expressly covers cellular phones and Congress identified telemarketing nuisance and privacy invasion broadly | TCPA language and findings emphasize "residential" and "to the home," suggesting Congress targeted in-home calls, not single texts to mobile devices | Held: Court rejects narrow reading; Congress considered mobile telemarketing and authorized protection beyond the home, so its judgment supports standing |
| Whether historical common-law analogues support concreteness (public nuisance/trespass) | The alleged harm is closely related to public nuisance and to common-law protections (including trespass to chattels’ dignitary interest) | Common law torts (e.g., trespass to chattels) traditionally required substantial or material harm; a single text is too trivial | Held: Court finds a close relationship to public nuisance and common-law harms; Spokeo requires analogy to types of harms, not identical thresholds, so historical practice supports standing |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (three-part Article III standing framework)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (intangible harms can be concrete; consider Congress and common-law history)
- Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2017) (telemarketing texts present the harm TCPA targets)
- Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2020) (unwanted texts invade privacy Congress sought to prevent)
- Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2019) (single-text harms align with TCPA purposes)
- Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019) (contrasting view that a single text may be qualitatively different)
- Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346 (3d Cir. 2017) (single prerecorded call can be the very harm the TCPA prevents)
- United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (discussion of trespass to chattels and dignitary interests)
- Krakauer v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 2019) (common law offers guidance but does not fix congressional authority to identify harms)
- Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (standard of de novo review on standing issues)