Crane v. Napolitano
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10006
N.D. Tex.2013Background
- DHS created in 2002; Morton Memorandum (June 17, 2011) and Napolitano Directive (June 15, 2012) govern prosecutorial discretion and deferred action for certain young immigrants.
- Directive directs ICE to refrain from removal of some aliens meeting criteria and to facilitate deferred action with work-authority applications processed by USCIS.
- ICE Deportation Officers and Enforcement Agents in Mississippi sue challenging constitutionality and statutory validity of Directive and Morton Memorandum; Mississippi separately alleges state fiscal costs from kept aliens.
- Plaintiffs allege multiple federal-law and constitutional challenges, including APA, INA provisions, and allocation of executive power; third cause challenges employment authorization during deferred action.
- Defendants move to dismiss for lack of standing, CSRA jurisdiction, and improper venue; motion is granted in part and denied in part.
- Court analyzes standing, distinguishing ICE Agent Plaintiffs and Mississippi, and concludes some claims lack standing while others have sufficient injury-in-fact to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do ICE Agent Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the prosecutorial discretion aspects? | Agents allege injury from being forced to violate oaths, comply with directive, or face discipline. | Allen violation-of-oath standing insufficient; burden of compliance alone not enough; potential injuries speculative. | ICE Agent Plaintiffs have standing to challenge prosecutorial-discretion aspects. |
| Is there standing related to the employment-authorization provision of the Directive? | Directive indirectly harms agents whose duties relate to employment-authorizations via deferred action. | No direct personal injury; issuance of work authorization is a separate USCIS process not availing agents. | Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge employment-authorization provision; claim dismissed without prejudice. |
| Does Mississippi have standing to challenge the Directive and Morton Memorandum? | Mississippi suffers increased fiscal costs from aliens allowed to remain under directive. | Injury is speculative and insufficiently concrete to confer standing. | Mississippi's claims are dismissed for lack of standing without prejudice. |
| Is venue proper in the Northern District of Texas given plaintiff residency and standing? | Engle resides in the district; venue appropriate for all plaintiffs. | Challenge to Engle’s standing could undermine venue; others not in district. | Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas; Engle resides there. |
| Does CSRA preclude federal-court jurisdiction over these claims? | CSRA does not apply because actions are not within specified adverse employment actions. | CSRA applies; jurisdiction may be precluded. | Court defers ruling on CSRA issue until trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (U.S. 1968) (violation-of-oath standing recognized historically)
- Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Association, 585 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1978) (violation-of-oath standing narrowed; no standing where only oath injury)
- Donelon v. La. Div. of Admin. Law ex rel. Wise, 522 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2008) (violation-of-oath standing narrowing; no injury where no adverse action from compliance)
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1967) (standing via injury from regulatory enforcement; prescribes ripeness and standard for pre-enforcement challenges)
- Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (U.S. 1972) (prospect of enforcement can sustain standing when injury concrete and imminent)
- KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1983) (standing where party anticipates enforcement and injury from regulation)
- United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc considerations on standing and injury from government action)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing elements: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (U.S. 1973) (standing when risk of prohibited conduct exists even without enforcement)
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (U.S. 1967) (pre-enforcement challenge principles used for standing)