Crane Co. v. DeLisle
206 So. 3d 94
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Richard DeLisle developed mesothelioma and sued multiple defendants alleging asbestos exposures from (a) Crane "Cranite" chrysotile gaskets at Brightwater Paper (1962–1966) and (b) Kent "Micronite" cigarette filters containing crocidolite (1952–1956); trial proceeded against Crane and R.J. Reynolds (successor to Lorillard and H & V).
- DeLisle offered four causation experts (Drs. Dahlgren, Millette, Crapo, Rasmuson); several nonparty manufacturers were proposed as Fabre defendants; trial court admitted experts after Daubert hearings and included Owens‑Corning and Brightwater on the verdict form.
- Jury returned an $8 million verdict apportioned among Crane (16%), Lorillard (22%), H & V (22%), Brightwater (20%), and Owens‑Corning (20%). Trial court denied directed verdicts and post‑trial relief; Crane and R.J. Reynolds appealed; DeLisle cross‑appealed inclusion of Owens‑Corning.
- Appellants challenged expert admissibility under § 90.702/Daubert, the failure to give a discrete jury instruction on contested product use (whether DeLisle smoked Kents), exclusion/inclusion of Fabre defendants on the verdict form, and excessiveness of damages; appellee defended expert testimony and verdict form decisions.
- The court reviewed whether the trial court fulfilled its gatekeeping role for each expert, evaluated the reliability of Dr. Longo’s cigarette‑filter testing (relied upon by other experts), and scrutinized counsel’s closing argument on damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DeLisle) | Defendant's Argument (Crane / R.J. Reynolds) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of causation experts (general and product‑specific) | Experts relied on accepted methodologies and literature to tie exposures to mesothelioma | Experts’ opinions were unreliable, speculative, or unsupported (ipse dixit); Daubert exclusion required | Court: abused discretion admitting Dahlgren, Crapo, and parts of Rasmuson; Dr. Millette admissible; reversed for R.J. Reynolds and directed verdict for Crane (Dahlgren was sole causation evidence vs Crane) |
| Reliability of Dr. Longo’s cigarette‑smoking experiments (and reliance by other experts) | DeLisle relied on Longo/ Millette testing to show crocidolite release from filters | Longo’s methods, lack of peer review, aged samples, and non‑replication make results unreliable | Court: Longo’s work was unreliable and not properly corroborated; experts relying on it failed Daubert for Kent‑specific opinions |
| Jury instruction on contested product use (whether DeLisle smoked Kent cigarettes) | Product‑use is a fact for the jury; instruction unnecessary because standard instructions cover it | Requested discrete threshold instruction; trial court refused and said standard charge subsumed the issue | Court: while not reversible alone, a targeted product‑use instruction would be appropriate at retrial when product use is contested |
| Damages and remittitur (improper closing argument comparing jury award to defendants’ ability to pay experts) | Award compensates non‑economic loss; counsel’s analogy to experts was a permissible rhetorical aid | Argument improperly invited jury to consider defendants’ ability to pay; award excessive and speculative | Court: counsel’s suggestion was improper and likely influenced the award; new trial on damages required for R.J. Reynolds (court to closely scrutinize damages on retrial) |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (establishes federal gatekeeping standard for scientific expert testimony)
- General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (trial court may exclude expert testimony when analytical gap between data and opinion is too great)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (Daubert principles apply to all expert testimony, including non‑scientific)
- United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir.) (expert testimony excluded where methodology and basis were not explained)
- Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 766 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir.) (expert excluded where opinion lacked reliable foundation and explanation)
- Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Group, Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.) (discussion of applying Bradford Hill criteria and weight‑of‑evidence methodology)
- Aubin v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 So.3d 489 (Fla.) (standard jury instructions presumed correct; additions required when necessary and supported)
- Werneck v. Worrall, 918 So.2d 383 (Fla. 5th DCA) (improper jury argument suggesting award based on defendant’s assets/number of trucks is prejudicial)