Craig Shipp v. Kevin Murphy, 9 F.4th 694

Background

Plaintiff Craig Shipp, a diabetic with Charcot joint and a prior toe amputation, arrived at SWACCC without his prescribed orthotic shoes (confiscated at jail intake) and repeatedly requested them.
On Feb. 5 nurse Kendall Smith noted a left‑foot wound and asked Dr. Mimo Lemdja to evaluate; Lemdja treated the left wound but did not document interventions; staff later reported she declined to put her name in the chart.
Shipp submitted written requests for orthotics (Feb. 1, 2, 12); Warden Arnold directed him to medical and referred the Feb. 12 request to Health Services Administrator (HSA) Lenora Turner.
A CCS physician on Feb. 16 documented medical necessity and ordered off‑loading; Warden Arnold obtained prison approval and Shipp received shoes Feb. 19. A nonhealing right‑foot ulcer developed and, over time, led to hospitalization and, ultimately, below‑knee amputation after release.
Shipp sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (deliberate indifference) and state negligence against Warden Arnold, Dr. Lemdja, Nurse Smith, HSA Turner, and Correct Care Solutions (CCS). The district court excluded portions of substituted expert Lori Roscoe’s testimony and granted summary judgment for the remaining defendants; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Judge Kelly concurred in part and dissented in part: she agreed exclusion of cumulative expert testimony was proper but would have reversed summary judgment as to Warden Arnold, Dr. Lemdja, and HSA Turner (finding triable issues).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of substituted expert testimony (Roscoe) — scope/qualifications	Roscoe, a nurse practitioner experienced in correctional health, was qualified to opine on physician conduct and on nursing/administrative failures; her opinions supplemented the deceased expert’s report.	Roscoe exceeded Dr. Wright’s prior report and lacked medical (physician) qualifications for opinions about a physician’s standard of care; new theories were untimely.	Court affirmed exclusion in part: district court should have applied federal (Daubert) law, but exclusion of opinions beyond Dr. Wright’s scope and those outside Roscoe’s expertise was not an abuse of discretion and was harmless/cumulative.
Warden Arnold — § 1983 deliberate indifference	Arnold personally knew of Shipp’s need (from written requests, walk‑through conversation, follow‑up practices with HSA) and unreasonably delayed—insulated by passing complaint to medical.	Arnold referred Shipp to medical, relied on medical judgment, and acted promptly once physician documented necessity (Feb. 16); no subjective knowledge of risk before that date.	Affirmed summary judgment for Arnold: no evidence he had requisite subjective knowledge or recklessness before Feb. 16; his reliance on medical staff was reasonable.
Dr. Lemdja — § 1983 deliberate indifference	Failed to document care, failed to order off‑loading or orthotics despite knowing prior prescription and treating Shipp twice; her inaction risked limb loss and was causally linked to ulcer/amputation.	She treated the left wound, referred for chronic care, had no duty to order orthotics before right‑foot blister developed; her actions did not amount to criminal recklessness.	Majority affirmed summary judgment for Dr. Lemdja (no deliberate indifference shown); dissent would have found triable issues on knowledge, failure to order off‑loading, and causation.
CCS, Nurse Smith, HSA Turner — corporate policy/scope and individual liability	CCS policy improperly required physician order before nurses could seek devices; Nurse Smith and Turner failed to secure shoes earlier, creating unconstitutional obstacles.	Nurse Smith acted within LVN scope by referring to physician; Monell bars respondeat superior § 1983 liability for CCS absent unconstitutional policy; Turner responded promptly on Feb. 15 and did not act with reckless indifference.	Affirmed summary judgment for CCS and Nurse Smith (no constitutional violation; vicarious liability barred). Majority also affirmed summary judgment for Turner; dissent saw factual disputes about Turner’s earlier inaction.

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (gatekeeping standard for expert admissibility)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (Daubert gatekeeping applies to all expert testimony)
Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc., 686 F.3d 618 (Eighth Circuit application of Rule 702)
Robinson v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 447 F.3d 1096 (expert competence must match subject matter; gaps go to weight)
Petrone v. Werner Enters., Inc., 940 F.3d 425 (Rule 16 scheduling/orders and limits on late expert expansion)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (prison officials’ duty; subjective deliberate indifference standard)
Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (elements for Eighth Amendment medical‑care claim)
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (government entity § 1983 liability principles)
Popoalii v. Corr. Med. Servs., 512 F.3d 488 (deliberate indifference requires more than negligence)
Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445 (official who knows serious needs are untreated may be personally liable)