Craig Childress v. Roger Walker, Jr., 787 F.3d 433

Childress, an inmate at BMRCC, sues numerous officials under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations related to a Lifestyle Redirection Program disk placed in his property, which led to his MSR revocation.
Upon program completion, a computer disk containing Childress’s resume was sent to property and placed with his belongings; he later released on MSR with a prohibition on computer items.
IDOC inspection after release uncovered the unopened disk, resulting in Childress’s jail custody and eventual MSR revocation; he sued after being detained post-release.
District court dismissed under PLRA review, concluding no defendant knew the disk placement violated release conditions and that Childress failed to state a claim; the court advised dismissal would count as a strike.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held the district court erred: (a) the complaint plausibly stated an Eighth Amendment claim against at least one defendant, (b) he should have been allowed to amend, and (c) the court abused its discretion by not addressing appointing counsel; the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Childress stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim.	Childress asserts deliberate indifference by officials who knew the program policy placed disks and jeopardized release conditions.	Defendants contend there was no personal knowledge or disregarded risk by any defendant.	Yes; the complaint plausibly alleges institutional policy and deliberate disregard by at least one official.
Whether the district court should have allowed amendment of the complaint.	Childress should have been allowed to amend to cure deficiencies and add knowledge of defendants.	District court acted within discretion to deny amendment as futile.	District court abused its discretion by not permitting amendment.
Whether the district court properly denied recruiting counsel for Childress.	Failure to recruit counsel harmed Childress and prejudiced his ability to litigate.	Court did not err in its consideration or decision not to recruit counsel.	District court abused its discretion; appointment of counsel should be considered on remand.
Whether the PLRA analysis was properly applied given Childress’ status.	Not a prisoner for PLRA purposes; PLRA screening misapplied.	PLRA screening can apply if proceeding in forma pauperis.	Court erred in its threshold PLRA analysis; remand needed for proper evaluation.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (When a constitutional claim relies on substantive due process, use it only if no explicit textual source exists; Eighth Amendment governs inmates.)
Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 1998) ((cited for standard on when to rely on substantive due process))
Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d 665 (7th Cir. 2006) (deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment claims)
Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2001) (example of Eighth Amendment claim requiring showing of unlawful confinement due to deliberate indifference)
Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2000) (liability for policy-level conduct under §1983)
Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1985) (personal liability requires knowledge or participation or direction)
Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395 (7th Cir. 1994) (supporting personal responsibility for constitutional deprivation)
Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2009) (agency knowledge and failure to prevent known risk)
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (standard: substantial risk of serious harm and disregard to abate)
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (liberal pleading standard for pro se plaintiffs)