Crae Robert Pease v. State
03-14-00512-CR
| Tex. App. | Dec 17, 2015Background
- Crae Robert Pease was charged by information with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass for entering 10820 Gerald Allen Loop on Dec. 11, 2013; convicted by jury and sentenced to 6 months jail and $2,000 fine.
- Fannie Mae purchased the property at foreclosure in Dec. 2010 and authorized realtor Hallie Waller to manage and rekey the house and to act as Fannie Mae’s representative with occupants.
- Pease claimed ownership (quitclaim chain and prior disputes), was evicted by writ of possession in May 2013, the property was rekeyed, and Waller gave Pease a criminal-trespass warning on May 31, 2013.
- Pease returned repeatedly, told police he would move back in, and was observed leaving the house by officers on Dec. 11, 2013 when arrested for trespass.
- At trial Pease waived counsel (Faretta), sought standby counsel which the court denied; he later appealed raising multiple procedural and substantive challenges to the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pease) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Denial of standby counsel and admonition | Denial of standby counsel and failure to re-admonish after denial violated rights; written waiver invalid because signed "Nein danke" | No constitutional right to standby counsel; prior Faretta hearing provided proper admonition; written signature not required | Trial court properly denied standby counsel; admonition requirement satisfied by earlier Faretta hearing; waiver effective despite unusual signature |
| 2. Visiting judge authority (oath) | Visiting judge’s oath not in record, so judge lacked authority to preside | Claim unpreserved; Pease never objected at trial | Point unpreserved; not reviewed on appeal |
| 3. Prosecutor authority (county attorney bond) | County attorney’s bond allegedly defective so prosecutor lacked authority | Argument waived—no trial objection and no authority showing defect required reversal | Waived for failure to object; not a basis for reversal |
| 4. Sufficiency and form of information | Information defective for not citing statute section and not identifying Waller/owner; jury charge did not track | Objection waived (no pretrial objection); amended information tracked statute language and was adequate; evidentiary facts not required in charging instrument | Waived where applicable; information sufficiently tracked Penal Code and charged offense |
| 5. Legal sufficiency of evidence | Pease believed he owned property, so entry was not "property of another" | Evidence (foreclosure, writ of possession, eviction, rekeying, trespass warning, surveillance) established someone else had superior right and Pease had notice | Evidence legally sufficient for conviction |
| 6. Mistake-of-fact instruction | Pease’s belief he owned the house required a mistake-of-fact jury instruction | Mistake-of-fact applies only where mistake negates culpable mental state (i.e., shows entry was unintentional or unaware of forbidden notice); no evidence supported that element here | Trial court properly refused instruction; no evidence raising required theory |
| 7. Owner/agent proof (Waller) | State failed to prove Waller was owner or authorized to warn | Waller had superior right to possession as Fannie Mae’s agent; owner need not personally appear | Waller’s status as agent with superior right sufficed; no requirement that title-holder appear |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1974) (defendant’s right to self-representation and requirement court ensure defendant is aware of dangers of self-representation)
- Burgess v. State, 816 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (written waiver not strictly mandatory where record otherwise shows valid waiver)
- Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (no constitutional right to standby counsel; court may allow standby counsel in its discretion)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for legal sufficiency: whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (definition of "owner" can include anyone with superior right to possession)
- Duron v. State, 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (charging instrument must on its face indicate the offense charged to vest jurisdiction)
- Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (test for whether an indictment/information sufficiently notifies the accused of charged offense)