Cox v. Glanz
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 15968
10th Cir.2015Background
- Charles Jernegan was booked into the Tulsa County Jail in July 2009, denied current suicidal intent on intake, but reported diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia and answered "yes" to other mental-health screening questions.
- Intake and nursing records recommended general-population placement; a mental-health call-out was scheduled after an inmate kiosk request but no mental-health clinician examined Jernegan before he was found hanged ~3 days after booking.
- Oklahoma State Dept. of Health investigated and found violations of state jail standards relating to segregation, medical evaluation, and suicide-risk housing.
- Carolyn Cox (decedent’s mother) sued Sheriff Stanley Glanz under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his individual (supervisory-liability) and official capacities, alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference resulting in suicide.
- The district court denied Sheriff Glanz’s summary-judgment motion (which asserted qualified immunity) on factual-dispute grounds but did not analyze clearly established law; Glanz appealed interlocutorily.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sheriff Glanz is entitled to qualified immunity on individual-capacity supervisory § 1983 claim (deliberate indifference re: suicide) | Cox: Jail practices and failure to train/supervise led to deliberate indifference; right to adequate medical care and freedom from deliberate indifference was clearly established. | Glanz: No subordinate had actual knowledge that Jernegan posed a substantial suicide risk; thus no supervisor-level deliberate indifference and qualified immunity applies; also contended no constitutional violation. | Reversed district court; Glanz entitled to qualified immunity because clearly established law in July 2009 did not put a reasonable supervisor on notice absent inmate-specific knowledge of substantial suicide risk. |
| Whether the district court’s denial of summary judgment was appealable (jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal) | Cox: Appeal lacks jurisdiction because district court relied on disputed facts; interlocutory review improper. | Glanz: Appeal proper as denial of qualified immunity involves legal questions about clearly established law; he accepted plaintiff’s factual view for appeal. | Court exercised jurisdiction over individual-capacity qualified-immunity question, finding it a legal issue reviewable on agreed facts. |
| Whether Sheriff’s official-capacity (Monell) claim may be reviewed on this interlocutory appeal (pendent appellate jurisdiction) | Cox: Deny pendent jurisdiction; interlocutory appeal of official-capacity denial not proper. | Glanz: (did not seek pendent jurisdiction); argued county policies were not the moving force and thus no official liability. | Dismissed appeal as to official-capacity claim for lack of appellate jurisdiction; court declined to invoke pendent jurisdiction. |
| Whether subordinates (intake nurse, mental-health staff) had subjective knowledge sufficient to support supervisor liability | Cox: Staff knew or should have known (prior incarcerations, kiosk request, screening answers) such that supervisor liability follows. | Glanz: Records show staff reasonably believed Jernegan not suicidal; no facts showing staff knew of specific substantial risk. | Court held record (even under plaintiff’s view) did not show subordinate knowledge of a substantial suicide risk; thus supervisor (Glanz) could not have had requisite knowledge. |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (establishes Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference framework for inadequate medical care)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (subjective knowledge element: official must know of and disregard an excessive risk)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (official-capacity suit is suit against the governmental entity; municipal liability requires policy or custom causing the violation)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts have discretion to address either prong of qualified-immunity analysis)
- Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015) (as of 2004, no clearly established constitutional right to suicide-screening protocols)
