Cousins v. Goodier
S20C-11-036 CAK
| Del. Super. Ct. | Jul 30, 2021Background
- On August 5, 2020 Scott D. Cousins filed a pro se lawsuit in Pennsylvania challenging Unionville High School’s mascot; the same day Rosemary Goodier emailed Bayard, P.A. criticizing the suit as "shockingly racist" and saying it sought to "protect his white, Christian heritage."
- Bayard then requested Cousins’ resignation; Cousins resigned and later formed his own firm after unsuccessful job searches.
- Cousins sued Goodier in Delaware Superior Court (filed Nov. 30, 2020) alleging defamation, tortious interference with contract, aiding and abetting, and civil conspiracy—all premised on the August 5 email.
- Goodier moved to dismiss under Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6), arguing her statements were protected opinion/rhetorical hyperbole and therefore nonactionable.
- The court framed the dispositive question as whether the email’s language conveyed provably false facts (actionable) or nonactionable opinions; it found the statements were protected opinion and dismissed all claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Goodier’s statements in the email are defamatory (fact vs. opinion) | Cousins: phrases like "shockingly racist" and "protecting his white, Christian heritage" imply false factual assertions about him and the suit | Goodier: the language is rhetorical hyperbole and opinion about the lawsuit, not factual assertions about Cousins | Court: statements are protected opinion/rhetorical hyperbole and not actionable as defamation |
| Whether the statements imply undisclosed defamatory facts (implied-fact theory) | Cousins: opinion could imply undisclosed factual bases that are false and actionable | Goodier: she disclosed the factual basis (link to the lawsuit) and expressed an interpretive opinion | Court: no plausible implied undisclosed defamatory facts; underlying factual basis was disclosed, so opinion nonactionable |
| Whether the private nature of the email reduces First Amendment protection | Cousins: private email to employer is less protected and more likely to be actionable | Goodier: private communication has same constitutional protection as public speech | Court: private email enjoys the same constitutional protection; context did not strip protection |
| Whether tort claims (tortious interference, conspiracy, aiding) may proceed when grounded in protected speech | Cousins: alternative tort theories can vindicate harms from the email | Goodier: First Amendment bars derivative tort claims based on protected expression | Court: derivative tort claims fail because they rest on nonactionable speech; First Amendment and precedent bar such suits |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248 (Del. 1987) (announces multi-factor test distinguishing fact from opinion)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (no separate constitutional "opinion" privilege; courts must assess verifiability and context)
- Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard in defamation suits and protection for non-actionable statements)
- Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029 (Del. 1998) (pleading standards on motions to dismiss; draw all inferences for plaintiff)
- NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (First Amendment bars tort claims based on protected political protest and advocacy)
- Kanaga v. Gannett Co., 687 A.2d 173 (Del. 1996) (opinion actionable if it implies undisclosed defamatory facts)