Courtney P. Brunetz v. Neil A. Brunetz
573 S.W.3d 173
| Tenn. Ct. App. | 2018Background
- Parties divorced in 2013; two minor children. The original Permanent Parenting Plan (PPP) made Mother primary residential parent (245 days/year) and Father had 120 days/year; major decisions required joint agreement; private school costs to be split pro rata.
- Father petitioned (2016) to modify the PPP alleging changed circumstances (more flexible work schedule, parental conduct harming children) and sought more parenting time; he also moved for a court-ordered psychological exam of Mother.
- Mother counter-petitioned alleging Father’s abusive/controlling behavior and sought restrictions on Father’s overnight visits when he had opposite-sex overnight guests and increased child support.
- The trial court ordered parental fitness assessments, held a bench trial (testimony from parties; considered evaluator Dr. Biller’s report and deposition), found a material change in circumstances, and modified the PPP.
- Modifications: Father received 10 additional summer days (total ~130 days/year); Mother was given sole decision-making authority over education and extracurricular activities; court prohibited communicating through the children and suggested counseling.
- Father appealed, challenging the minimal increase in parenting time, alleged upward deviation in child support via educational decision change, and the sua sponte award of sole educational decision-making to Mother.
Issues
| Issue | Brunetz (Father) Argument | Brunetz (Mother) / Trial Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether granting Father only 10 additional days (total ~130/yr) abused discretion instead of maximizing participation | Trial court should have awarded substantially more time (argues goal is "maximum participation") | Trial court carefully applied Tenn. Code §36-6-106(a) factors and found Mother's stability and primary-caregiver role supported current schedule with limited increase | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; court considered statutory factors and evaluator’s report but was not bound by it |
| Whether trial court’s allocation of educational decision-making to Mother caused an upward deviation in Father’s child support for private school tuition | Father: If Mother unilaterally chooses private school, he should not be forced to pay more than originally contemplated; modification amounts to upward deviation | Mother/Trial Court: Original PPP already contemplated private school and pro rata cost-sharing; no material change to tuition allocation in modified PPP | Affirmed — no upward deviation; tuition provision remains consistent with original PPP |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by sua sponte granting Mother sole decision-making over education/extracurriculars | Father: Change was not litigated or briefed and lacked specific factual findings | Mother/Trial Court: Parties’ history of conflict over educational decisions harmed children; TCA §36-6-404 grants authority to allocate parental responsibilities to minimize harmful conflict | Affirmed — trial court had authority and made best-interest findings under §36-6-106(a) supporting sole decision-maker for these areas |
| Request for appellate attorney’s fees | Father requested fees on appeal | Mother requested fees on appeal | Denied/waived — both parties failed to properly raise the issue in their statements of issues on appeal; requests deemed waived |
Key Cases Cited
- Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2013) (modification analysis requires finding material change then applying §36-6-106(a) best-interest factors)
- Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) (trial court has broad discretion in setting residential parenting schedule; appellate courts should not "tweak" schedules)
- Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011) (defines abuse of discretion standard in family-law context)
- Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002) (standard of review for non-jury family cases: de novo with presumption of correctness for factual findings)