Courtney Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16628
| 3rd Cir. | 2014Background
- Plaintiff Courtney Douglass received a debt-collection letter from Convergent Outsourcing; an internal Convergent account number (R-xxxx-5459-R241) was visible through the envelope’s glassine window above her name and address.
- A QR code on the visible portion (not challenged on appeal) could reveal the same visible information plus an amount.
- Douglass sued under the FDCPA, alleging Convergent violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8), which bars "any language or symbol" on an envelope other than the debt collector’s address (with a limited business-name exception).
- The district court granted summary judgment for Convergent, adopting a judicially created "benign language" exception to § 1692f(8) and finding the account number innocuous.
- The Third Circuit vacated and remanded, holding (1) § 1692f(8) covers language visible through a windowed envelope, and (2) the account number disclosed identifying information implicating FDCPA privacy concerns and therefore violated § 1692f(8).
Issues
| Issue | Douglass’s Argument | Convergent’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1692f(8) applies to language visible through a transparent window | §1692f(8)’s plain text covers language on an envelope; windowed content is "on the face" | Windowed content is not meaningfully "on the envelope" or should be treated differently | Held: §1692f(8) applies to language visible through a transparent window of an envelope |
| Whether disclosure of an internal account number violated §1692f(8) | The statute’s plain meaning prohibits any language/symbol other than permitted items; the account number identifies her as a debtor and implicates privacy | Even if literal reading applies, a "benign language" exception avoids absurd results and would permit innocuous markings like account numbers | Held: The account number violated §1692f(8); it is not "benign" because it can identify the debtor and implicates privacy concerns |
| Whether a judicial "benign language" exception should defeat liability here | N/A (Douglass argued account number is not benign) | Courts should adopt a benign-language exception to avoid absurd consequences of a literal reading | Held: Court did not decide whether such an exception exists generally but held that even if it does, the account number here is not covered because it conflicts with the FDCPA’s privacy purpose |
Key Cases Cited
- Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2013) (FDCPA is remedial and construed broadly)
- Goswami v. American Collections Enterprise, Inc., 377 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 2004) (adopted a benign-language exception for innocuous envelope markings)
- Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316 (8th Cir. 2004) (permitted benign markings that do not reveal debt-collection purpose)
- Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) (FTC Staff Commentary is not binding agency rulemaking)
- Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2002) (limits on stretching benign-language exceptions when core FDCPA concerns implicated)