Couret-Rios v. Fire & Police Emp. Ret. Sys., 227 A.3d 637

Officer Carlos Couret-Rios, a Baltimore police officer, was rear‑ended on duty on August 12, 2014 and diagnosed with a concussion/mild traumatic brain injury (TBI); he was placed on restricted duty thereafter.
Initial vestibular and neck complaints largely resolved, but months later he developed persistent short‑term memory and attention deficits; neuropsychological testing (Dr. Blackwell) diagnosed mild neurocognitive disorder/post‑concussion syndrome and linked deficits to the August 2014 injury.
Couret‑Rios applied for line‑of‑duty (LOD) disability benefits (Feb. 2, 2016), claiming physical and mental incapacities; a hearing examiner found permanent incapacity from attention and memory deficits caused by the brain injury and awarded LOD benefits.
The Circuit Court affirmed; the Court of Special Appeals reversed (majority: deficits are mental, not physical); a dissent would have upheld LOD based on the injury‑to‑brain nexus.
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Special Appeals, holding that in some circumstances manifestations of a physical brain injury (e.g., post‑concussion memory/attention deficits) may qualify as a "physical incapacity" for LOD benefits and affirmed the hearing examiner's award.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether attention/memory deficits from mild TBI qualify as a "physical incapacity" under the F&P statute for LOD benefits	Deficits are direct manifestations of a physical injury to the brain and thus are physical incapacities	Deficits are mental in nature; statute's plain meaning distinguishes mental vs physical incapacity and limits LOD to physical	The term is ambiguous; where medical evidence links deficits to a physical brain injury, those manifestations can be "physical incapacity" — LOD award upheld
Whether Marsheck bars treating brain‑injury‑caused incapacity as "physical"	Marsheck (a statute‑of‑limitations case) is distinguishable; it doesn’t forbid considering the nexus between injury and incapacity	Marsheck’s distinction between "injury" and "incapacity" supports reversal here	Marsheck is distinguishable (procedural/limitations context); it does not preclude finding a brain‑injury nexus that yields physical incapacity
Standard of review / deference to hearing examiner	Agency factfinding is presumptively correct and must be deferred to absent arbitrariness	City argued legal error in characterization of incapacity	Court applied deferential review, found the hearing examiner’s factual findings reasonable and not arbitrary

Bd. of Trs. of Fire & Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Balt. v. Kielczewski, 77 Md. App. 581 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989) (interprets F&P statute to require a "physical incapacitation" for LOD benefits)
Marsheck v. Bd. of Trs. of Fire & Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. of City of Balt., 358 Md. 393 (Md. 2000) (distinguishes "injury" from "incapacity" in the context of the statute's five‑year limitations rule; relied on and distinguished)
Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172 (Md. 2006) (articulates deference to administrative factfinding; courts must not substitute their own factfinding for agency findings)